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Historians concerned with the National Park Service, managers in the Park
Service, and critics and defenders of the Service, frequently state that the Or-
ganic Act which brought the National Park Service into existence in 1916
contains a "contradictory mandate." That "contradictory mandate" is said to
draw the Park Service in two quite opposite directions with respect to its pri-
mary mission; the contradiction is reflected in management policies; the inabil-
ity to resolve the apparent contradiction is blamed for inconsistencies in those
policies.
The apparent contradiction is contained in a single sentence of the pream-
ble to the act. That sentence reads, in addressing the question of the intent of
the Service to be established by the act, that the Service is
to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life therein [within the national parks] and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will
leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'
This paper is an attempt to determine the intent of Congress with respect to
the Act of 1916. It is the work of an historian, not a legal scholar. The histo-
rian recognizes that the intent of the whole of Congress in passing an act, and
the intent of the individuals who framed that act, do not perfectly coincide;
that intent must nonetheless be interpreted as individual; that intent changes;
and that the law of unintended consequences looms large in any legislation.
A MOMENT FOR CONTEXT
The National Park System of the United States is unique among the
world's systems of government preserves. Because of this uniqueness, refer-
ence to attitudes, legislation, or management practices elsewhere, even if legal-
ly admissible, is of little help in understanding the American National Parks.
One says of "little help," however, rather than of no help, precisely because
the system's unique characteristics may be brought into focus best by a com-
parison with park systems elsewhere. Consider these aspects of the system's
uniqueness.
* Randolph W. Townsend Professor of History; Chair, Program in Environmental Studies,
Yale University.
1. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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The Unique System
The National Park System of the United States is the world's largest, both
in the number of units (375 as of June 1997) and in total land area. Thus,
legislation passed with respect to the Park System, beginning with the National
Park Service Act signed by President Woodrow Wilson on August 25, 1916
(also referred to as the Park Service's "Organic Act"), whether generic to the
system as a whole or specific to an individual unit, has more extensive appli-
cation than any other park system in the world. Such legislation influences, is
affected by, and is of concern to all Americans.
The National Park System of the United States is the most complex, the
most carefully articulated, and thus the most specific system in the world.
There are twenty-one types of units (national park, national monument, na-
tional preserve, national reserve, national seashore, national lakeshore, national
historical park, national battlefield park, national military park, national bat-
tlefield, national battlefield site, national historic site, national memorial, na-
tional wild, scenic, and/or recreational river, national parkway, national scenic
and historic trail, national memorial, national recreation area, national scientif-
ic reserve, national capital parks and a miscellany of units grouped simply as
"other") that are administered directly by the Park Service.! Several units
exist in forms of partnership and loose affiliation, and three programs (national
historic landmarks, national natural landmarks, the national registry of historic
places) are run by the Park Service with respect to properties that, in general,
it neither owns nor administers. Despite the care with which these various
types of parks are designated, and the high degree of specificity that applies to
the laws creating specific units, all are governed by the Organic Act.
The National Park System of the United States is genuinely national, for
there are units in all but one state and in all dependencies. In some nations,
such as Australia, areas designated national parks are in fact administered by
state and local authorities. In some nations, such as Canada, resources adhere
to the individual province, so that national park legislation may be substan-
tially compromised at a more local level, as in the province of Quebec.
The National Park System of the United States is the world's most intel-
lectually elegant system, for it has grown, and in more recent years has most
consciously been added to, by the application of a National Park System Plan
to which a series of Theme Studies is central. These Theme Studies, ranging
over a number of subjects, both with respect to natural areas and to cultural
and historical experiences of significance to the nation as a whole, have been
conducted with care and imagination, with both Park Service professionals and
informed non-governmental experts involved. While Canada, and to a lesser
2. Omitted from this list of types of units are (a) units with slight variations in title which
are, despite those variations, clearly of one of these types; (b) seven properties administered
through the National Capital Parks but not in fact included in those parks, such as the White
House, and (c)-quite confusingly-several national recreation areas, one "national volcanic mon-
ument," and three national monuments which, despite the use of titles generally specific to the




extent New Zealand, have imitated the Theme Study approach to the evalua-
tion and designation of potential Park System units, neither has applied this
approach so fully. While at times a unit may be added to the U.S. System
through more local political pressure, the overwhelming body of units reflect a
close awareness on the part of the Park Service of Congress's desire to adhere
to Theme Studies and to carry them out expeditiously.
The National Park System of the United States also has the warm support
of the American people, who clearly cherish the system even when they do
not fully understand it. This has not always been the case, of course, and any
given unit may at some point have been the object of hostility, especially
locally, but there can be no doubt that by the 1970s the system was embedded
within a vigorous, growing, wide-spread public sentiment for conservation and
protection of the environment. This sentiment has not abated, and the public
brooks little compromise with what it understands to be the System's mission.
The same may be said of National Park Systems in few if any other countries.
To be sure, public-and thus legislative-awareness of this mission has
changed across time. For example, the initial campaign for the creation of
national parks was strongly supported by the tourism industry, most particu-
larly by railroads and, soon after, by automobile associations. At the time of
passage of the Organic Act of 1916, the railroad was a power in the land, the
only feasible means of mass transport to the great Western parks, while the
automobile was being admitted to parks in ever greater numbers. The goal of
the Park Service created by the act was to "preserve, forever unimpaired, the
sublime beauty, dignity, and nobility of national park landscapes";3 the Or-
ganic Act was silent on issues of biological preservation as we would under-
stand the term today. But then, so too was the Constitution of the United
States initially silent on such issues as privacy or anti-trust goals, though lan-
guage was present by which courts would, in this century, find implied consti-
tutional intent.
Acts Subsequent to 1916
Whatever the intent of Congress in 1916, with the enactment of the Na-
tional Park Service Act, Congress may change its intent by subsequent acts.
The Act of 1916 is examined in its full legislative history in the material that
follows. But first, a sense of context requires some comment on the manner in
which Congress added to the intent of the original act.
That intent has been Congressionally modified by two types of acts. There
are broad-ranging acts relating to natural resources which impact upon the
national parks, and there have been specific acts, notably those of 1970 and
1978, that have extended the discussion of the purposes of parks. Of the first
type of act, there have been four above all that apply to the national park
system. The Wilderness Act of 1964 created a National Wilderness Preserva-
tion System, prohibited all commercial activities, motorized vehicles, perma-
3. Richard West Sellars, The Roots of National Park Management: Evolving Perceptions of
the Park Service's Mandate, J. FORESTRY, Jan. 1992, at 16, 17.
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nent roads, or development of any kind within designated wildernesses, and
provided that portions of National Park System units might be so designated.
The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968 designated segments of rivers as part
of a system in which waterways were to be maintained in or returned to a
pristine state. (Subsequently a designation of Recreational River was added.)
The Clean Water Act of 1972 set as a national goal the elimination of all
pollutant discharges into waters and making waters safe for fish, wildlife, and
people. While the deadline mandated by Congress was relaxed, the act contin-
ues to apply within national parks. The Endangered Species Act of 1973 de-
fined endangered and threatened species and required the government to draw
up lists of these species and to acquire lands and waters necessary to their
protection. As many national park units function as wildlife preserves, the act
has direct application to the parks.
Additionally, a series of acts relating to natural resources broadly, notably
the National Environmental Policy Act, the National Forest Management Act,
and the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, are also relevant to the
parks. The last two acts require the U.S. Forest Service and the Bureau of
Land Management to coordinate their resource management plans with other
agencies, including the National Park Service. These acts quite obviously tilted
the 1916 mandate toward a more compatible interpretation of the Park
Service's responsibilities. To be sure, none of these acts defined the key word
"unimpaired" in the 1916 act, but taken together, they provided a functional
definition that went beyond "preserve unimpaired" virtually to call for the
restoration of the ecological integrity of the National Parks.
National Park Acts of the 1970s
Congress went some distance toward functional definitions in two park-
specific acts in 1970 and 1978. In an amendment to national park legislation,
Congress declared that National Parks "derive increased national dignity and
recognition of their superb environmental quality through their inclusion ...
in one national park system preserved and managed for the benefit and inspi-
ration of all the people."4 Clearly here Congress was holding National Parks
to an "increased" or higher standard of protection, this higher standard was
based on the maintenance or achieving of superb "environmental quality," and
each park benefitted by being included in a system that benefitted all: that is, a
threat to one was a threat to all. Further, Congress now called for preservation
and management that would benefit and inspire "all the people," thus by im-
plication ruling out management decisions that would redound to the benefit of
only "some of the people": interest groups, local parties, one might argue even
historically vested bodies that lacked clear national significance.
In 1978, Congress reaffirmed the Organic Act and declared that parks
must be protected "in light of the high public value and integrity" of the park
system in a way to avoid "derogation of the values and purposes" for which
4. National Park System General Authorities Act, Pub. L. No. 91-383, § 1, 84 Stat. 825
(1970) (emphasis added) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § la-I (1994)).
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the parks, collectively and individually, were created.5 "High public value" is
somewhat subjective and clearly changes over time; by the use of this crite-
rion, Congress appears to have instructed the National Park Service to manage
parks in relation to public sentiment and, in effect, sociological jurisprudence.
By this standard in 1978 Congress gave a powerful mandate to the Park Ser-
vice, a mandate which would prohibit actions that could have the effect of
"derogation" of park values. Virtually all commentators at the time and since
have concluded that the 1978 provision added to the Park Service's mandate
to protect ecological values.
Of course, the amendments of 1970 and 1978 apply to actions, not to
inaction. That is, where an invasive activity, practice, or structure already
existed, was the Park Service required to take action to eliminate it, or to
mitigate its effects, or was the Park Service merely required to brook no future
intrusions? In some measure the answer to this question requires site-specific
knowledge, since national parks clearly are meant to be held to a higher stan-
dard than other, nearby, surrounding, or environing federal lands and one must
know what those standards are, and thus what the specific threat, incursion, or
compromising situation may be. Does, for example, an historic ditch that con-
veys water from, across, through, or into national park lands, for the benefit of
private persons or municipalities, now require removal? That such a ditch
requires mitigation there can be no question, under the expectation of parks
being held to higher standards; that a local ditch, used for irrigation, would not
meet park criteria is abundantly clear; that such a ditch impairs the "values
and purposes" of parks also seems clear in the context of modem sensitivities
and the legislation of 1970 and 1978. But neither act directs the Park Service
specifically to remove such a ditch. Absent such instruction, a question is, may
or should the Park Service do so?
Historic Structures within National Park Units
Today, more than half of the 375 units of the National Park System are
primarily cultural/historical in their purpose, and there is likely to be greater
growth in the future of such parks than there will or can be of natural/scenic
reserves. Further, public awareness of historical structures, and public concern
for their protection, has grown at least as rapidly as public awareness and
concern for specified sites within the natural environment. It is not, therefore,
a digression to comment briefly on how the Antiquities Act of 1906, and other
legislation relating to historical preservation, would bear upon an historic ob-
ject within a national park that had been set aside primarily for natural and
scenic purposes. The example already proposed, an "historic ditch," may be
used.
Might a ditch on park lands be an "historic object" in the meaning of the
Organic Act, and thus entitled to consideration for protection on that ground?
If the ditch were present in 1916, surely the answer is yes; if the ditch were
5. Act of Mar. 27, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-250, § 101(b), 92 Stat. 166 (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § la-1 (1994)).
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constructed after 1916, the answer is far more ambiguous. However, on either
side of the date of the Organic Act, management would not be required to
protect the ditch either as a structure or object or in its historic use unless it
clearly met certain criteria.
In August of 1916 the Department of the Interior was responsible for
twenty-one national monuments and one archaeological reservation. Of these,
nine were defined as being primarily of historical significance, and therefore
these units may be taken to suggest what Congress meant at that time by an
"historic object." Of these units, five were purely archaeological in their intent
(e.g., Chaco Canyon, Gran Quivira). These ancient ruins would more com-
monly be referred to today as "cultural" rather than "historical." One unit,
Dinosaur National Monument, was set aside for the fossil record, that is, for
paleontology rather than history as commonly understood. Only three units
provide any functional definition of what Congress may have had in mind
when it referred to "historic objects" in 1916: El Morro, a great rock on which
Spanish, Mexican, and American explorers had inscribed their names;
Tumacacori, the ruins of a significant mission church near the Arizona-Mexico
border; and Sitka, site of a Tlingit village in Alaska. These were quite major,
visible, and substantial sites. Clearly an historic ditch, no more than an historic
cabin, was envisioned by Congress in 1916 as automatically embraced by the
act.
Whatever Congress may have had in mind in 1916, the Historic Sites Act
of 1935 provided criteria for the protection, selection, or conservation of "ob-
jects" that qualified for the attention of the National Park Service, so that
thereafter decisions with respect to the protection of historically-used struc-
tures, or other alterations of nature within a national park, could be made on
the basis of relatively clear principles. The Act of 1935 built upon the Antiq-
uities Act of 1906, and it specifically required that to be of significance under
the Act a site, building, or object must:
1) Be associated with and now be the "primary tangible resource" that
illustrates, recalls, or characterizes "individuals, groups, events, processes,
institutions, movements, lifeways, folkways, ideals, beliefs, or other patterns or
phenomena that had a decisive impact on or pivotal role in the historic or
prehistoric development of the Nation as a whole." By this criterion, an irri-
gation ditch-to continue with the example chosen-would be worthy of pro-
tection provided it were the "primary tangible resource" illustrative of the
process of irrigation, or of a folkway that hinged upon the practice of irriga-
tion, provided that the ditch in question were, indeed, "primary," "tangi-
ble"-for which read, retaining its substantial integrity as a structure-and
relating to the Nation "as a whole." Thus a ditch that served or serves local
purposes would not qualify, while a ditch that served wide-spread purposes
illustrative of national growth would qualify, provided it were the "primary"
(best surviving or most important) example illustrative of irrigation.
2) A ditch might qualify provided it were a "masterpiece of type," or
had a "pivotal influence" in the later development of its type of construction
as an aspect of "technological or engineering design." Thus the Park Service
could recognize different stages in the development of irrigation, and protect
[Vol. 74:3
A CONTRADICTORY MANDATE?
more than one ditch, provided each was an exemplar of a stage of develop-
ment that transcended local use. This would require passing a test of integrity,
or primacy, and finally of significance to the development of a particular ap-
plication of engineering that had national impact.
3) A ditch might be protected if, in its structure, it provided "informa-
tion" that was "essential to professional or public understanding of human
development," such information not being obtainable by example elsewhere;
and
4) The ditch would have to "possess an exceptionally high degree of
integrity of form, material, and setting."
These criteria were subsequently expanded so that, in 1996, they number
six. To the four stated above, one must add that such an historic place, site,
structure, or object may be designated if it is a) representative of some "great
idea or ideal of the American people" and/or b) is "associated importantly
with the lives of persons nationally significant."
There are also negative criteria. Ordinarily reconstructed structures do not
fall under the act. Nor do structures that have achieved significance within the
last fifty years. Nor do structures, even though they may have integrity, which
have been moved from their original locations, unless the structure is histori-
cally significant for reasons of architectural merit.
There are two programs under which a site already within a national park
unit can be formally designated as historic: the National Landmarks and the
National Register.
There are now nearly 2,200 National Historic Landmarks. While one
might argue that historic structures within a national park's borders automati-
cally are entitled to special consideration, the fact that several structures that
are inside park boundaries have been designated independently as National
Historic Landmarks suggests that to guarantee preservation, or to cause the lo-
calized setting aside of criteria relating to natural preservation within a park
that has been created primarily for landscape/scenic/wildlife purposes, such
structures need be given the highest consideration only if they meet the sepa-
rate Landmark criteria. In other words, historic structures that do not meet
such criteria may be removed-or not-depending upon management deci-
sions relating to the overall purpose of an individual park as stated in that
park's enabling act.
Within Rocky Mountain National Park, for example, twenty-three struc-
tures or sites (including the old Fall River Road) had been placed on the Na-
tional Register of Historic Places as of 1988.' There is no requirement that a
structure be nationally significant to be placed on the National Register, for
"properties significant to the nation, a state, or a community" may be nomi-
nated by states, federal agencies, and others. There are well over 50,000 places
on the Register, including over 900 within units of the National Park System.
6. See HISTORY DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INT., CATALOG OF NATIONAL HISTORIC
LANDmARKs (1987).
7. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE HISTORIC PRESERVATION OFFICERS, U.S. DEP'T OF
THE INT., NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES, 1966-1988 (1989).
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In this way the Park Service has honored its obligation, as stated in the Organ-
ic Act, to recognize historic objects.
However, the continued presence of an "historic object" may militate
against the primary purpose of a park unit, and unless that object is judged to
be of National Landmark status, the Park Service may override the preserva-
tion of the historic object in the interests of the park's primary purpose. Nor
does placement on the National Register assure any form of protection, local,
state or federal; indeed, some two percent of National Register places have
been destroyed.
The "historic object" reference within the Organic Act of 1916 has be-
deviled historians and non-historians alike. Within the original national parks,
those "historic" objects overwhelmingly were fences and gates used to control
grazing, ditches and other structures to effect irrigation, or cabins used by
hunters, foresters, and recreationists prior to the creation of a unit. The ques-
tion has arisen often-most dramatically in Grand Teton and Olympic national
parks in recent years-as to whether any or all of these three categories of
"objects" either require protection, or may receive protection, under the Organ-
ic Act. The conclusion is that such "objects" do not require protection, and
that the burden of proof is on the advocates of such protection, given the crite-
ria relating to national significance, integrity, and "exhibit" value.'
Contextually, in addition to considering the impact of post-1916 natural
resource legislation, of acts specific to the national parks, and of acts relating
to historical preservation, on the Organic Act of 1916, one must consider one
other aspect of the intent of Congress: how the meaning of language changes.
One need not belabor the point here beyond observing that in usage and
meaning, terms like "conserve" and "preserve" have functionally changed
across time. Thus, the use of such terms in legislation subsequent to 1916 may
not have precisely the same connotations as these words had at the time.
8. In fact, few irrigation ditches would be likely to qualify in future for protection under
these criteria, since the Park Service has, for example, already designated its choice of eight Na-
tional Historic Landmarks with respect to the sub-theme of irrigation under the broad theme of
engineering. Roosevelt Dam in Arizona, the first major project completed under the Reclamation
Act of 1902, was designated in 1963, and in the citation of designation was meant to stand for the
entire Salt River Irrigation Complex; San Bernardino Ranch, also in Arizona, designated in 1964,
commemorates and illustrates ranch irrigation through the use of springs; the Folsom Powerhouse,
in California, was designated in 1981 in recognition of the first use of high-voltage alternating
current from a hydroelectric generating plant (1895); the Columbia Historic District, also in Cali-
fornia, was designated in 1961, in part to include millraces and sluice boxes relating to gold min-
ing; the Old Mission Dam, near San Diego, was demarked in 1963 to commemorate the first ma-
jor irrigation-engineering project on the Pacific Coast undertaken by Spanish inhabitants; the
Carlsbad Reclamation Project, dating from the 1880s, was designated in 1964 to commemorate the
earliest extensive irrigation project built by private enterprise, and to honor the inhabitants of the
Pecos Valley for their achievements; and Bonneville Dam and adjacent structures were honored in
1987 as the best example of a water diversion project. The Espada Aqueduct, in Bexar County,
Texas, was designated in 1964 as the only remaining Spanish structure of its type in the United
States. It is now part of San Antonio Missions National Historical Park. With this articulation of
sites illustrative of the theme of irrigation, it is difficult to imagine that a case could be made for
the national protection of other structures or objects relating to the more-or-less routine transport
of water in the 19th- or 20th-century West.
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CREATING A NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE ACT OF 1916
The National Park Service was created by Act of Congress in August,
1916, and President Woodrow Wilson signed the Organic Act on August 25.
The act was the result of some six years of discussion, intense lobbying by a
variety of interest groups, and growing public concern. The leaders of the
campaign to establish a Park Service were, in the House, Congressmen Wil-
liam Kent and John Raker, both of California, and in the Senate, Reed Smoot
of Utah. Congressman Kent had the close advice of Frederick Law Olmsted,
Jr., son of the founder of American landscape architecture and creator of Cen-
tral Park. Stephen T. Mather, a wealthy borax industry executive (who later
would become the first full-time Director of the new National Park Service
created by the act) was heavily involved, as were a number of recreational,
outdoor, tourist, and automobile associations, of which the American Civic
Association was the most important.
These advocates spoke of most of the thirty-seven parks that then existed,
as well as the wide range of park proposals pending before Congress, in terms
of scenic reserves, often invoking a comparison with Switzerland, which it
was invariably argued had capitalized on its natural scenery more effectively
than any other nation. Both railroad and automobile interests advocated more
consistent administration of the existing parks in order to protect them more
effectively, and also to make certain that accommodations and campgrounds
were held to a consistent standard for the public's pleasure. While the rail-
roads wished to bring spur lines to the borders of the parks, they seldom ar-
gued for actual entry. Automobilists wished to see roads to and within the
parks upgraded so that visitors could tour the parks in greater comfort. All
spoke of "scenery" with respect to the principal natural parks, though with a
variety of qualifiers, and all referred to the need for preservation of that scen-
ery while also making the scenery accessible for the "enjoyment" of the pub-
lic. Thus, any discussion of Congressional intent in 1916 involves some under-
standing of what was meant at the time by "scenery," as well as the specific
references to it in hearings, debate, legislation, and the correspondence of the
key legislators.
In 1915-16, during the Congressional session which enacted the Organic
Act, there were twenty-one members of the House Committee on the Public
Lands, eleven of whom had served on the Committee in one or more previous
Congresses and had experience with earlier omnibus park bills. Of these mem-
bers, some were silent throughout, speaking neither at hearings nor in debate.
The papers of sixteen of these members have survived. Debate, and the
members' papers, make it abundantly clear that the key members in the
House, with respect both to the Organic Act and to specific national park bills
during this time, were Congressmen Kent and Raker, Congressman Irvine
Lenroot of Wisconsin, who was a watchdog preoccupied with scrutinizing all
bills for their financial impact on government spending, and Congressman
Edward T. Taylor of Colorado, who was an advocate of the bill that created
Rocky Mountain National Park in 1915 and who saw the two acts as closely
related. While other members spoke on occasion, their concerns were to clari-
fy matters relating to grazing, roads, or fire protection, and almost never did
1997]
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any Congressman other than these four speak to general principles of preserva-
tion and protection or to matters concerning water. Indeed, many key members
of the Committee, who were active with respect to other matters that came
before it, were silent on the Organic Act of 1916. Their papers are also silent:
in the hundreds of Volumes of manuscripts in the Carl Hayden Collection at
Arizona State University, for example, there are frequent references to national
parks from the 1930s forward, but the collection is, except for a single docu-
ment, utterly silent on the act of 1916. To cite a second example, the papers
of Congressman Addison T. Smith of Idaho, now in the Idaho State Historical
Society in Boise, are "a dead collection" on any matters relating to the public
lands.9 Thus, in the House one best focuses on Congressman Kent, whose bill,
H.R. 8668, was ultimately enacted (with slight modifications) as H.R. 15522,
and whose papers are voluminous.
The story is similar in the Senate. While several Senators spoke with
respect to their final bill, S.9969, which was offered by Senator Smoot, almost
no one took up broad questions of the language of the bill. An examination of
the surviving papers of all members of the Senate Committee on the Public
Lands and Surveys for 1915-16 reveals that only Smoot was closely attentive
to the legislation. His papers, most particularly his diary, in the library of
Brigham Young University, supplement his public remarks.
The preamble, or "statement of fundamental purpose" for the Act of 1916,
was drafted by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., at the request of Congressman
Kent. Thus Olmsted's views, though he was not a member of the legislature,
are also important to understanding Kent's intent. Fortunately, his papers sur-
vive at the Library of Congress (and, to a lesser extent, at the former Olmsted
offices and studios in Brookline, Massachusetts).
The governing sentences of the National Park Service Act of 1916 read as
follows:
The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of
the Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reserva-
tions hereinafter specified by such means and measures as conform to
the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reserva-
9. The Hayden manuscripts are typical of those of members of the House Committee. In
1915 he was involved in an International Irrigation Congress but saw no need to mention this
subject when discussing the Rocky Mountain National Park Act that year, and his papers are silent
except for a copy of Enos Mills' What We Owe to Our National Parks. In 1916 Hayden was fully
engaged in speaking out on women's suffrage, the European war, and prohibition; if he ever spoke
in public on the Organic Act, there is no record of it in his papers. When Hayden did refer to
parks, the content of his papers is typical for the time: in 1913 he apparently agreed that an ar-
chaeological site near Phoenix should be saved because it was a commercial asset, and he appar-
ently agreed with the Phoenix Board of Trade in its demand for auto roads along the Grand Can-
yon. The Smith Collection contains a clipping file on Good Roads and nothing on parks. The
Papers of James Wickersham, in the Alaska State Library in Juneau, show diary entries for the
months in which the Park Service Act was discussed, and though Wickersham comments on other
bills to come before the Committee on the Public Lands, he is quite silent on the Organic Act. See
Hayden MSS (on file with AriL.jna State University (Tempe) box 607, folder 20, and box 631,
folders 13 & 14); Addison Taylor Smith Collection MS (Idaho State Historical Society, 22 finding




tions, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoy-
ment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'0
It is this language which requires explication, and it is the path to this lan-
guage, beginning with the first suggestion that there should be a National Park
service or bureau, that requires tracing if we are to understand Congressional
intent.
Taft and Ballinger Recommend a Bureau
Beginning early in 1910 the American Civic Association had declared the
need for a special bureau, most likely within the Department of the Interior, to
administer the nation's national parks, of which by then there were eleven,
with a twelfth to be added in May. (There were also eleven units with other
designations.) There also were by the end of that year seventeen national mon-
uments, under the administration of the Department of the Interior or the De-
partment of Agriculture, and the Association wished to see common principles
of administration applied, certainly to the parks and perhaps to the monu-
ments. In his annual report for 1910, the Secretary of the Interior, Richard
Ballinger, recommended that Congress should create a "bureau of national
parks and resorts" in order to assure future generations competent administra-
tion of the parks." This statement was immediately taken up by the Ameri-
can Civic Association though never again was there reference to "and resorts"
in relation to a bureau's prospective title.
This did not mean that some of the parks were not seen in some measure
as resorts, of course, but rather that those groups lobbying for creation of more
parks, and more consistent administration of them by a central bureau, pre-
ferred different terminology. The lobbyists often referred to the parks as "the
nation's playgrounds," as "havens of rest," as places where the public might
enjoy solitude, recreation, and "a sense of good health." To some, however,
"resort" carried a somewhat undemocratic connotation, while "play-
ground"-which was universal, for the people-became the preferred term at
the time. In all the lobbying, Congressional hearings, and debates to follow,
emphasis remained upon ways of bringing benefits "to the people," and the
only analogous discussion to "resorts" vs. "playgrounds" would occur in 1916,
when the automobile was seen by some, as it was being admitted to the parks,
to be an instrument of the rich. By the time the Kent bill was before Congress,
most members spoke little of the parks being resorts, and virtually all used as
preferred language, "the nation's playgrounds," a term also used by the Ameri-
can Civic Association.
Secretary Ballinger was in the midst of a major scandal at the time he
10. 16 U.S.C. §1 (1994).
11. Bills to Establish a National Park Service and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R. 434
& H.R. 8668 Before the House Comm. on the Public Lands, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916) [here-
inafter Hearing 1916].
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made his recommendation. The primary student of Richard Ballinger's land
policies, James Penick, Jr., has argued that the scandal that surrounded
Ballinger in his last months, prior to his resignation on March 1 1-usually re-
ferred to in standard textbooks as the "Ballinger-Pinchot" controversy, in
which Ballinger lost, at least in the eyes of the public (and of historians sub-
sequently), to Gifford Pinchot, the dynamic director of the U.S. Forest Ser-
vice-was not in fact a scandal so much as a clash between theories. Ballinger
ran the General Land Office-the primary agency for disposing of the public
domain-according to nineteenth-century principles while new theories of land
management had, by 1907, won over a large public who believed that private
individuals ought not to be able to control essential public resources such as
water power. Penick astutely observes that "[t]he same generation which
would soon sanction immigration laws to protect the genetic purity of the
American population and would support a National Park Service to protect the
heritage of natural beauty awoke somewhat earlier to the revelation that the
material wealth had been acquired by a few men who used their great eco-
nomic power to exploit the farmer and laborer."' 2 These people, associated
with the Progressives though not necessarily Progressives themselves, felt the
General Land Office had "abetted [a] great betrayal."' 3
"These people," largely middle class, wished to see the grand scenery of
America preserved virtually as a patriotic act. They did not want any of the
natural scenery within the national parks to be used to private ends. A shift
"from the general to the particular" had occurred, so that there was an in-
formed public ready to argue the merits of damming the Hetch Hetchy Valley
in Yosemite National Park, for example, as there were those who were pro-
moting a National Park Service to be concerned with the integrity of all parks.
On February 11, 1911, when President William Howard Taft sent his
special message on conservation to Congress, he omitted any reference to
"resorts" altogether, recommending the establishment of a bureau of national
parks, as essential to the "proper management of those wondrous manifesta-
tions of nature," which were, he said, "so startling and so beautiful that every
one recognizes the obligations of the Government to preserve them for the
edification and recreation of the people.""' He thus combined the inspiration-
al, educational, and recreational purposes of the parks in a lockstep that would
become fixed in the minds of park proponents. On February 12, 1912, Taft
spoke in public, listed some of the national parks (to which he added the
Grand Canyon, which was then a national monument), and declared that in
"consideration of patriotism and the love of nature and of beauty and of art" it
was essential to spend the money needed to "bring all these natural wonders
within easy reach of our people."' 5 A bureau would improve the parks' "ac-
12. JAMES PENICK, JR., PROGRESSIVE POLITICS AND CONSERVATION: THE BALuNGER-
PINCHOT AFFAIR 24 (1968).
13. Id.
14. President William Howard Taft, (Feb. 11, 1911) in Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 4.
15. Taft's address on parks appears in A Bill to Establish a National Park Service and for
Other Purposes: Hearing on HR. 104 Before the House Comm. on the Public Lands, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 6 (1914) [hereinafter Hearing 1914] (introduced by Congressman Raker).
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cessibility and usefulness," he concluded. 6 These were common themes at
the time, for parks were likened to "nature's cathedrals" through which the
United States, a raw young country, matched in splendor the great human-built
cathedrals of Europe (a commonplace comparison, especially for Yosemite),
and in which nature imitated the colors of art (usually said in reference to
Yellowstone or the Grand Canyon). Such messages made clear that the
President regarded, and believed that the American people regarded, the parks
as symbols of the nation and thus of vital importance. However, Taft's words
did nothing to define standards of protection, much less of administration. This
would be left to Congress.
President Taft's concern had grown directly from the first major confer-
ence devoted specifically to national parks, held at Yellowstone in 1911.
There, in a park policed by the U.S. Army, where different concessionaires
charged different prices for transport from different entrances, where hotel
facilities were deemed on the whole inadequate and automobiles were not yet
permitted, a number of interested parties, including members of the House and
Senate, spoke of the need for national parks to serve the nation's health, pre-
serve its great scenic wonders, and provide for recreational outlets for the
people. Nature was compared to architecture, Providence (and at times God)
were invoked, and most speakers believed that these wonders were intended
for human "delight."' 7
The Hearing of 1912
The first substantive discussion of the purposes of a National Park Service
or Bureau occurred during the House hearings on H.R. 22995 on April 24 and
25, 1912."s During the discussion much was revealed concerning what, in the
eyes of individual members of the House and in the mind of the Secretary of
the Interior, Walter Lowrie Fisher, national parks were meant to be. The hear-
ing moved expeditiously, with significant questions being fed to the Secretary
by Congressman Raker, who clearly was committed to the creation of some
type of professional service. Though the hearing was ill-attended-of twenty
members of the House Committee on the Public Lands, only ten were present,
and but half of these spoke-it brought forth several basic points.
After noting that the Secretary of Agriculture, James Wilson, approved of
the proposed Park Service, while offering some amended language to the bill
calculated to put greater distance between parks and national forests, the Com-
mittee called upon Secretary Fisher, who in his prepared statement gave six
reasons why a bureau or service was desirable. (In subsequent discussion he
elaborated upon some of these and added two additional reasons.) Interesting-
ly, his first goal was to establish criteria for national park status and to hold to
16. Id.
17. The background to the post-1911 bills is explored in Donald C. Swain, The Passage of
the National Park Service Act of 1916, Wis. MAG. HIST., Autumn 1966, at 4, 4-17.
18. A Bill to Establish a National Park Service, and for Other Purposes: Hearing on H.R.
22995 Before the House Comm. on the Public Lands, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. (1912) [hereinafter
Hearing 19121.
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these criteria in the face of local pressure (in which he included political fig-
ures and associations). 9 Reverting to this point later, Fisher observed that
there were among the now twelve existing national parks three that were not
of national significance (while he did not name them, correspondence at the
time makes it clear he had in mind Platt National Park in Oklahoma, Sullys
Hill National Park in North Dakota-both ultimately demoted or abol-
ished-and the Hot Springs Reservation in Arkansas). The twelve parks in-
cluded duplications, were an "accumulation," and were not all of equal signifi-
cance. A bureau would give the Department added strength in resisting future
inappropriate proposals."0
Fisher also cited as justification for a bureau the need for coordination in
policy and funding. Lacking a bureau, any experience gained in one park was
of little practical use in another park (here he spoke of the need for an engi-
neer who could formulate and apply common policies with respect to roads
and bridges, and the development of such "incidental power" from the natural
waterfalls as could appropriately be developed for lighting hotels and roads
without interfering with scenic values). He cited the need for continuity and
consistency in granting leases for accommodation, in order to avoid the chaos
inherent in policies that ranged from no provision for granting leases through
ten- to twenty-year leases (and one instance-Mount Rainier National
Park-where the enabling act was silent on any time limit)."' Finally, a bu-
reau could set administrative and management policy on a range of problems
in order to assure visitors some common standard of experience, whether in
hotels, campgrounds, or transport. As something of an afterthought, Fisher
added in closing that a bureau would make possible "scientific" determinations
(he cited the question of the effect of the use of oil on roads within the parks)
not then available.2" Under questioning, Clement S. Ucker, the chief clerk
then responsible for the parks, pointed out that the intention also was to bring
the existing national monuments and the Casagrande Ruin (as then spelled)
Reservation in Arizona under the proposed bureau's jurisdiction. 3
Throughout testimony, Fisher, Ucker, and those Congressmen who spoke,
reflected a desire to see the lands administered by the proposed bureau viewed
as being unique, nationally significant, and a coherent whole rather than an
"accumulation." When discussing the "automobile question," Fisher noted that
"to help the scenic beauty of the parks," they ought "to be kept properly" and
asserted that there was "a park point of view": "The Forest Service, for in-
stance, in its regulations, treats of the matter only from a timber point of view
and not from a scenic point of view at all."" One important goal of manage-
ment was "not to destroy the scenic effect." Congressman Raker concluded, in
response to a colleague's observation that the parks were "simply large areas,"
that "you do not find any on earth that contains the scenic beauty and gran-
19. Id. at 4-6.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 7-9.
22. Id. at 10.
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id. at 13.
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deur and necessity for preservation as in those national parks."'
What Is Scenery?
This hearing in 1912 was typical of discussion to follow. For the most
part, both members of the House and wimesses from the executive branch
restricted themselves to mid-level generalities. No one asked probing questions
about precisely how scenic values were to be preserved or, indeed, what scen-
ery was. Nonetheless, three generalizations emerged. Parks were to be held to
a higher standard of preservation because of their grandeur and (with monu-
ments) scientific values than were other federally-administered lands; this
would best be achieved through a separate bureaucracy which would under-
stand these different needs and values; and while roads, accommodations, and
other man-made intrusions were necessary in order to enhance the recreational
purposes of the national parks, such physical objects were to be subordinate to
the preservation of the "scenery." Never, however, was scenen, rLimed, for
clearly all believed they understood its meaning.
There is no doubt that Congress wished to protect the scenery of the na-
tional parks. (Protection is not, of course, preservation, a word more common-
ly applied through the Antiquities Act of 1906 to national monuments, espe-
cially of an archaeological nature.) Though "scenery" is to some extent subjec-
tive, one should note that the word has certain agreed meanings which have
not changed substantially. "Scenery" is "the aggregate of features that give
character to a landscape"--a definition that allows for scenery to fall well
short of "grandeur" and which thrusts a significant burden onto "landscape,"
which is defined (somewhat circuitously) as "a section or portion of scenery,
usually extensive, that may be seen from a single viewpoint."'26 This sense of
"scenery"--that it represented a viewpoint, or perspective, that was wholly to
be determined by humans-is reinforced when one notes the second definition,
"the painted backdrops on a theatrical stage."" When Peter Roget first pre-
pared his now famous thesaurus in 1853, he noted as synonymous terms for
"scenery" the words "view," "scene," "sight," "prospect," "outlook," "look-
out," "vista," "perspective," and "landscape."' (Other terms, such as "pan-
orama" or "waterscape," are products of the twentieth century.) One may
argue, then, that if one may assume those who used the term "scenery" in
conjunction with "protection" knew the value of the words they chose, they
intended that priority should be given to land that embraced several natural
features (an aggregate) that were capable of being viewed from some point,
whether road, trail, outlook, above or below, and that any alteration of timber
cover, water course, rock face, or naturally occurring floral or faunal presence
was to be avoided.
In 1911 the Century Company had issued a new Dictionary and Cyclope-
25. Id. at 23.
26. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1176 (Coll. ed. 1968)
(emphasis added).
27. THE AMERICAN HERrrAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1979).
28. ROGET's INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS § 446.6 (4th ed. 1911)
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dia which had become the favored reference of Congress. In addition to invok-
ing the words "aggregate of features or objects" and "character," this authori-
tative dictionary had added a definition of scenery which also included the no-
tion of the "picturesque or pictorial point of view."' Thus, no matter which
dictionary one might consult, "scenery" is tied to "a place," or "features";
involves more than one "object"; and derives special value from the "aggre-
gate" or conjunction of those objects, as viewed from some undefined but
nonetheless human vantage point.
The Hearing of 1914
The National Park Service bill was introduced again at the 63d Congress,
and as H.R. 104 it was the subject of another hearing before the Committee on
the Public Lands on April 29, 1914, at which the idea of a "scenic point" was
introduced by one of the speakers, Henry S. Graves, the Chief Forester for the
Department of Agriculture. 3 However, this hearing turned largely upon the
practical question of whether a separate service would reduce expenses, be
more efficient, and eliminate the need to use U.S. Army troops in some of the
parks, a practice against which the War Department was protesting. Well at-
tended, this hearing was particularly revealing on the army question but did
little to advance general definitions of parks; there was no discussion of natu-
ral resources or of the meaning of protection. Congressman Raker again made
the running, referring to the parks as "playgrounds," embracing the widely
held language of the good roads, health, and recreation interests that were
pressing both for a uniform service and for additional parks.3
President Taft's statements were placed on the record. He clearly felt
there should be more national parks; equally, he wanted a bureau so that the
parks "may become what they are intended to be when Congress creates
them."32 He made no effort to suggest what that intention was, since quite
properly this was a matter for the legislative branch. Raker was the only mem-
ber of the Public Lands committee who appeared to be concerned with the fact
that there was no clear definition of the purposes of parks beyond being in
themselves "great natural wonders" preserved for the benefit of the people,
and he introduced to the hearing an address by Secretary Fisher made the
previous year in which Fisher remarked that while he did not wish to intrude
upon the terrain of such men as J. Horace McFarland, the President of the
American Civic Association, or Senator Smoot, who had spoken strongly
about the need for parks at the 1911 Yellowstone conference, he nevertheless
found "there is no consistent theory of legislation with regard to the national
parks."33 Fisher addressed himself to the concerns he had laid out in the 1912
29. DIcTIONARY AND CYCLOPEDIA VIII, 5385 (1911).
30. The Papers of Henry S. Graves are in the Yale University Library Archives. Though rich
and relatively extensive (53 boxes), they contain no topical files on national parks. They do cover
the period under scrutiny here, 1910-16, and were searched on all points on which Graves is men-
tioned hereafter.
31. Hearing 1914, supra note 7, at 75.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 7.
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hearing, adding two additional reasons for creating a park service: the need to
protect the public and enhanced effectiveness in publicizing the parks. He
commended the great railroads, and the Northern Pacific in particular, for their
enlightened practices in promoting but not penetrating parks.34
Thus, little that was new emerged from the 1914 hearings, except for the
revealing comments of Adolph C. Miller, assistant to the Secretary of the
Interior, who after much praise for the soldiers who patrolled Yellowstone and
Yosemite parks, and some battering by members of the committee who feared
the growth of another expensive government bureaucracy, found that his most
persuasive case appeared to be in demonstrating that the public did not like
the presence of the army in the parks.3" "Military rule," said Denver S.
Church, Congressman from California, "spoils the scenery and makes cold
water taste flat. '3 6 Miller did make it clear that the parks were faced with
requests that a bureau could best resist, citing the case of an effort by the
power and electric company operating in Sequoia National Park to change the
location of their conduits and intakes, moving nearer a waterfall, that ought
not to be permitted if a move was to the "detriment" of the "scenery of the
park," a judgment best made on the spot by a trained individual.
The Department of Agriculture, which administered the national forests
and the national monuments within forest boundaries, was a consistent sup-
porter of the 1914 and 1916 national park service bills. Here the commonly
held notion that Interior and Agriculture were in opposition to each other is
quite untrue. Graves had been dubious about national parks prior to 1914, but
he had changed his mind by then. He reasoned that a separate park service,
which could hold to higher standards of protection and scenic values, taking in
only areas of truly national significance, would in fact protect the forest ser-
vice in its holdings, since so many proposed parks were in Forest Service
lands but were not of national significance. As Graves said, the Grand Canyon
should be a national park-thus he helped make clear the criteria, at least of
size and splendor, for inclusion in the system-while other areas (he named
Mount Hood, Estes Park-the current way of referring to what would become
Rocky Mountain National Park, or the Mount of the Holy Cross, all of "a
special scenic character") might begin as national monuments administered by
the Department of Agriculture and then, upon further study, become parks. In
short, a vigorous, well-managed, and clearly-defined system of national parks
would protect the forest department from poaching by local interests that
thought the name "national park" would bring in more tourists and more
quickly lead to good roads.37
Later, after a National Park Service was created, the NPS proved Graves
to be accurate in his prediction. Between 1916 and 1932 over thirty-five na-
tional park proposals came before the Park Service, and its Director, or the
Secretary of the Interior, declared with respect to twenty of these proposals
34. Id.
35. Id. at 74-75.
36. Id. at 75.
37. Id. at 79.
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that the areas in question were not worthy of national park status, leaving the
lands in the hands of those then administering them, usually the Forest Ser-
vice.38
The Hetch-Hetchy Factor
After 1913 discussion of national park bills, and of any bill to require the
application of uniform policies to parks, was constrained by bitter and recent
memories on all sides of the great battle over the Hetch Hetchy Valley in
Yosemite National Park. Many conservationists felt betrayed by President
Wilson when, in December, 1913, he signed a bill authorizing the building of
a great dam that flooded the Hetch Hetchy, thus infringing in the most basic
and dramatic way on a park and most clearly contradicting any rhetoric to that
point about scenic preservation and recreation being the highest values. Most
of the players in the Rocky Mountain National Park and National Park Service
bills were involved in these heated debates, and at times virtually coded re-
marks were made in hearings and in correspondence which, read in the context
of the Hetch Hetchy, carried more pointed meanings than they may appear to
do today." Certainly this was the case with Congressman Kent, who in fa-
voring the dam had lost the affection of "the father of national parks," John
Muir, and had gained the suspicion of the American Civic Association and the
Sierra Club. For Congressman Raker, the situation was especially difficult, for
it had been his bill that created the dam, and taken together with other efforts
on his part to bring water to his northern California constituents, he did not, in
fact, appear to most proponents of parks to be a firm friend. This may well
account for his emotional commitment to the park service bill, and especially a
somewhat remarkable outburst during the hearings of 1916,4 and surely con-
tributes to the silence of many members of Congress on water matters, in
particular, as they related to parks in 1914 to 1916.
Historians of public land policy for this period often detect four separate
and distinct political groups which, depending upon the issue at hand, inter-
acted in alliance. One, who called themselves the preservationists, were op-
posed to virtually any use of natural resources that would lead to their unnatu-
ral alteration. A second group, the "advanced progressives," advocated federal
development as opposed to state or private enterprise. A third group, business-
minded conservationists, were at the center of an emerging alliance between
commerce and conservation; they wished to see private business, and some-
times the states, directly involved in both development and protection. It was
this group that was most vocal on the national park issue, for they recognized
that a magnificent protected area might be of great local commercial value.
(Some subsequent scholars have referred to those who espoused such an alli-
ance, especially when they worked with the advanced progressives, as "utili-
38. These are spread throughout the National Park Service records in the National Archives
seriatim.
39. Hetch Hetchy is put into perspective by SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE
GOSPEL OF EFFiCtENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959).
40. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 119-20.
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tarian-conservationists.") A fourth group simply opposed any federal regulation
of resources within the states, invoked arguments of states' rights, and are
usually referred to as the laissez-fairists.4"
The significance of the Hetch Hetchy controversy to understanding the
language used in discussing national parks subsequent to 1913 is that these
four groups changed positions respective to each other during the affair, pro-
ducing much bad feeling, and many who were involved in the bills of 1915
and 1916 had been burned over the Yosemite "violation," as some called it.
Kent, for example, had been thought to be in the first group and then moved
to the second; Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin had been so outspoken a mem-
ber of the second, he was expected to be a champion of subsequent bills but
remained largely silent on national park issues; Smoot, Lenroot, and Senator
Henry Lee Myers of Montana belonged to the third group and would ordinari-
ly have been opposed to President Wilson, but the war in Europe had muddied
alliances, and they frequently proved to be the most powerful voices of moder-
ate conservatism. Senators John F. Shafroth of Colorado and Clarence D.
Clark of Wyoming were ideological laissez-fairists on most positions, and yet
Shafroth would, after much soul-searching, support the Rocky Mountain Na-
tional Park and Clark would defend a no-grazing provision for Yellowstone.42
Again, the person most alert to the damage the Hetch Hetchy type of
controversy could do was William Kent. He had been a municipal reformer in
Chicago who, despite having moved to California, with a home in Matin
County, had remained active in Chicago politics until 1907. He disliked
crowded cities and ordinarily favored any bill that would provide parks and
playgrounds within the cities or would slow the pace of urbanization outside
them. With the Hetch Hetchy he found himself in conflict, for he did not want
to see a national park lessened and yet he believed that an assured supply of
fresh water to San Francisco would so enhance health as to outweigh his con-
victions about the psychological and spiritual benefits of solitude and nature.
As one scholar has remarked, "Kent was progressive except on the question of
progress itself' while J. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic
Association, who opposed Hetch Hetchy, "was conservative except regarding
conservation. ' Thus Congressional discussions of both the Rocky Mountain
bill in 1915 and, more directly, the Park Service bill in 1916, were shaped by
memory of the wounds inflicted upon each other only a few years before, and
no one appeared to want to directly confront the question of whether, in the
41. On these groups see in particular ELMO R. RICHARDSON, THE POLITICS OF CONSERVA-
TION: CRUSADES AND CONTROVERSIES, 1897-1913 (1962).
42. These divisive woundings are discussed in Roderick Nash, John Muir, William Kent, and
the Conservation Schism, 36 PAC. HIST. REV. 423, 423-33 (1967).
43. STEPHEN Fox, JOHN Mum AND Hs LEGACY: THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVE-
MENT 138 (1981). The Raker Bill to darn the Hetch Hetchy was proposed in the Senate by
Nebraska's "fighting liberal," George W. Norris. See NORMAN L. ZUCKER, GEORGE W. NORRIS:
GENTLE KNIGHT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966); RICHARD LownTr, GEORGE W. NORRIS: THE
PERSISTENCE OF A PROGRESSIVE, 1913-1933 (1971). Lowitt points out that Norris favored protec-
tion of scenery but that he felt the beauty of the Hetch Hetchy valley would be enhanced by a
lake with a dam the color of the surrounding mountains. Lowrrr, supra, at 23. This was in keep-
ing with the view, popular early in the century, that a "water feature," even if artificial, enhanced
a view.
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event of a conflict between good health through pure drinking water or good
health through protected and open spaces, they would favor one over the oth-
er. Kent, having seen the divisiveness of the issue, appears to have deliberately
avoided it.
Through their successive introduction, the Raker and Smoot bills to estab-
lish a national park service remained unaltered, save for one change in punc-
tuation which unlike such changes in diplomatic documents, had no apparent
significance. Congress intended to leave to the Secretary of the Interior the
actual task of determining policies which, by their nature, would more clearly
define what parks were to be. Section 4 of the bills consistently instructed the
Secretary to "make and publish such rules and regulations as he may deem
necessary and proper... for the management, use, care, and preservation of
such parks, monuments, and reservations [this word was retained throughout to
accommodate Hot Springs Reserve], and for the protection of property and
improvements, game, and natural scenery, curiosities, and resources there-
in." This remained the language of H.R. 424, introduced on December 6,
1915, on which the Committee on the Public Lands held hearings on April 5
and 6, 1916.
The Hearings of 1916
The House hearings of April, 1916, dealt with two bills, H.R. 434
(Raker's bill) and H.R. 8668, a new bill introduced by Congressman Kent.
H.R. 8668 differed from H.R. 434 in that it contained the significant preamble
quoted at note 2 above. The Chairman of the Committee on the Public Lands,
Scott Ferris of Oklahoma, perhaps sensing that victory could be achieved in
this session of the 64th Congress, let Kent virtually run the hearing, though
Raker also was present. Since his first attempt to sponsor a successful bill,
Raker had visited Yellowstone, several monuments and all the parks in Cali-
fornia, Yosemite being in his district and Lassen and Cinder Cone monuments
having been so prior to a revision of district boundaries. He entered a formal
written statement into the record in which he told of his long-standing interest
in the parks and endorsed the views of several men who had testified or of-
fered statements at previous hearings, including Secretary of the Interior Fish-
er, Chief Forester Graves, and J. Horace McFarland.' He also commended
the work of Rowland B. Grant, a conservation writer, and described the park
bill as his "pet project," as the matter uppermost on his mind. "[M]y whole
soul is wrapped up in this legislation," he told his colleagues, in an emotional
appeal to have the bill passed within the next few days.
46
Congressman Kent was no less concerned with speed, however, and being
a more seasoned politician and more popular colleague, he was both more
active behind the scenes and more effective in the committee. Remarking that
44. Hearing 1914, supra note 7, at 3.
45. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 93. On McFarland, see ERNEST MORRISON, J. HORACE
MCFARLAND: A THoRN FOR BEAUTY (1995) (see especially chapter 11).
46. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 120.
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he had no desire to have his name attached to the legislation, and bowing to
Judge Raker's primacy in having brought a bill to the House, he unsuccessful-
ly sought to put aside the single issue which all agreed had sidetracked
Raker's earlier bills: the question of costs. These hearings were better attended
than any previous ones on the issue, and as Kent noted privately, with war in
Europe and a national election fast approaching, it was now or never if this
bill-any bill, his or Raker's-were to be passed. Kent believed his position
was clear enough. What he wanted when he agreed to introduce a bill in place
of Congressman Raker's was a document that was "as short and uncluttered as
possible," knowing that this meant that language would not be provided to
clarify all future areas of conflict and ambiguity. The resulting act was only
two and a half pages long.47
The 1916 hearings substantially repeated the previous hearings, even to
the extent of reading into the record the text of those hearings. The Secretary
of the American Civic Association, Richard B. Watrous, as well as McFarland,
spoke, rehearsing the history of previous efforts to create a service and invok-
ing the spirit of John Muir, who had died two years before. Watrous more
than any other commentator argued that parks were a "business undertaking,"
that public ignorance kept them from being the profitable enterprises they
could be, and that Switzerland and Canada had well-organized park systems
which led to large sums of money for their governments as well as for private
enterprise.' Speaking first, he set the tone for the hearing, which overwhelm-
ingly focused on the twin financial questions, could the parks make money
and would a bureau be costly, by reminding the Congressmen that during the
recent international expositions in San Francisco and San Diego, to which
many thousands of visitors travelled from the East, perhaps 75 percent of all
tourists had chosen to go or return via the Canadian railroads because of the
existence of national parks in the Canadian Rockies, parks that were well
publicized by the Canadian Commissioner of National Parks, R.B. Harkin.
Watrous quoted Harkin approvingly when the commissioner declared that
parks "will pay not only in the strictly commercial dollars and cents way but
they will also pay in a still more important way-by adding to the efficiency
and virility of the nation."
Thereafter the hearing focussed upon the costs of maintaining the parks,
especially the expense of building and maintaining roads and the merits of
charging a fee to those who entered in automobiles, and on whether a bureau
would make for such efficiencies as actually to save the government money.
Congressman Ferris declared that the hearing would concern itself only with
"the general subject," and when it appeared that the committee might again
47. On the framing of the bill, see HORACE M. ALBRIGHT & ROBERT CAHN, THE BIRTH OF
THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: THE FOUNDING YEARS, 1913-33 34-45 (1985). This is a primary
source, being Albright's memoirs. He was present at the meetings in Kent's home. AIbright ap-
pears to have been the first administrator to refer to a national park "system." See DWIGHT F.
RETrIE, OUR NATIONAL PARK SYSTEM: CARING FOR AMERICA'S GREATEST NATIONAL AND HIS-
TORIC RESOURCES 13 (1995).
48. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 5.
49. Id. at 8.
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fail to report out a park bill, and especially when- there was a possibility that
some members would delay the bill by demanding more information on the
question of tolls, Kent spoke up vigorously to cut off discussion on the issue
until some future time when it would become apparent whether or not the
automobile would be the standard means of transportation to the parks. He
told the committee that the time had come to "get action" and that matters of
detail could wait.50
In the hearings only two new points were made. For the first time the
phrase "national park system" was used, involving the image of a systematic
inventory of the nation's grandest scenic landscapes and natural and scientific
curiosities, all to be combined (with the ultimate transfer of national monu-
ment properties then under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture)
within one efficient and consistent administration.5 Secondly, for the first
time the notion of the parks as great educational enterprises, places to which
the public could come to learn about nature, geology, fossils or sedimentation,
while also increasing their working efficiency, their health, and their patrio-
tism, was set out clearly, in this case by McFarland and by R.B. Marshall, the
Superintendent of the National Parks, a newly-created position. 2 The "great
parks are, in the highest degree, as they stand today, a sheer expression of
democracy, the separation of these lands from the public domain, to be held
for the public, instead of being opened to private settlement."'53 McFarland
read into the hearing the sentence Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. had framed as
the preamble to Kent's bill and declared that this statement must "remain as it
is, unless it can be strengthened; it should never be weakened."'54
Olmsted's Statement of "Fundamental Purpose"
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. is important to understanding the language of
Kent's bill. The son of Frederick Law Olmsted, the great creator (with Calvert
Vaux) of Central Park, the person who had been one of the first to promote
the idea of a Yosemite National Park, and the "father of American landscape
architecture," the younger Olmsted had by 1916 long emerged from his distin-
guished father's shadow and was both a famed designer of major parks in his
own right and a member of the federal government's Commission of Fine
Arts. Olmsted shaped his language in conjunction with Kent, Raker, and oth-
ers. The key provision Olmsted originally wrote for H.R. 8668 read:
50. Id. at 76.
51. Id. at 56.
52. Id. at 54.
53. Id. at 53.
54. Id. at 54.
55. In 1911 Olmsted and McFarland had used this language:
That the parks, monuments and reservations shall not at any time be used in any way
contrary to the purpose thereof as agencies for promoting public recreation and public
health through the use and enjoyment by the people of the said parks, monuments and
reservations, and of the natural scenery and objects of interest therein, or in any way
detrimental to the value thereof for such purpose.
Letter from J. Horace McFarland, President of the American Civic Association, [hereinafter
McFarland] to Richard Ballinger, Secretary of the Interior, [hereinafter Ballinger] (Jan. 3, 1911)
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The fundamental object of these aforesaid parks, monuments, and
reservations is to conserve the scenery and the natural and historical
objects therein and to provide for the enjoyment of said scenery and
objects by the public in any manner and by any means that will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.
This would be very slightly altered in its final form, to state (as we have seen)
that the "fundamental purpose" of the parks was "to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."56 Each signifier here has
undergone change since 1916; a linguist might argue that the change is some-
what differential between sections of the country, but none would argue that
change has not occurred or that such change has not tended in one direction,
toward a wider interpretation of the key words "conserve," "natural," "histor-
ic," "objects," "wildlife," and "unimpaired." As this last word set the only
actual standard (as opposed to purpose), it has been seen as most open to
attack, interpretation, expansion, and ambiguity.
What may we reasonably believe Congress, and those who framed the
legislation, meant by "unimpaired"? To stalk this question, one must turn to
the papers, first, of Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., and then to those of Congress-
man William Kent, for it was Olmsted who had insisted that there must be an
overriding and succinct statement of purpose (today one would say "mission
statement"). Since he expected and hoped for substantial public use of the
parks, he was not content with leaving an area "unimpaired for future genera-
tions," but inserted the key words, "for the enjoyment of' those generations.
Herein lay an ambiguity and a potential source for future conflict. "En-
joyment" reasonably required access, and at the time roads, trails, hotels,
campgrounds, and administrative facilities did not seem unduly invasive. The
act cannot have meant that "unimpaired" was to be taken in its strictest sense,
particularly since the act included specific approval for certain inevitably
compromising actions: leasing for tourist accommodation was the most obvi-
ous example.
The Organic Act also contained a provision likely to affect natural re-
sources in parks. By reaffirming an act of 1901 that authorized the Secretary
of the Interior to permit rights of way in Yosemite, Sequoia, and General
Grant national parks, for pipelines, canals, ditches, water plans, dams, and res-
ervoirs "to promote irrigation or mining or quarrying, or the manufacturing or
cutting of timber outside the parks," the act of 1916 showed that public use of
the national parks might, when approved by the Secretary, extend to consump-
tion of some of the park's resources. Did the statement of "fundamental pur-
pose" temper this section of the bill?
(on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783, 61st Cong.). Ballinger had
promptly accepted this language. Letter from Ballinger to Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. [hereinafter
Olmsted] (Jan. 4, 1911) (on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783, 61st
Cong.).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
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One should not make too much of this provision. First, it applied by name
to only three national parks, all in California, where water interests were pow-
erful and historically entrenched within and around the three parks in question.
That the act was silent on other parks may be taken to mean that the provision
did not-or at least did not readily-apply to them, unless specific legislation
with respect to a park mentioned such rights of way (the 1915 act creating
Rocky Mountain National Park did contain such a provision). Second, to the
degree that multiple use was peculiar to the mandate of the National Forest
Service, other language in the Organic Act of 1916, and most particularly in
subsequent amendments to that act in 1970 and 1978, clearly meant to provide
national parks with a higher standard of protection than in national forests or,
conversely, those acts were less permissive of the application of a policy of
multiple use. Third, across time the conflict between any grant of authority to
the Secretary to provide for multiple use and the language relating to "unim-
paired" and "for future generations" was interpreted by the courts to stricter
and stricter (that is, more protective) meanings of "unimpaired."
What did Olmsted mean at the time? We have a commentary by him,
written in 1937, in which he provides a gloss on his meaning. In the midst of
debate in Colorado over the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, a water diver-
sion plan that would bring water from the western slope of the Continental
Divide to the parched agricultural lands on the eastern slope, in part by the use
of a tunnel that would pass through, or under, Rocky Mountain National Park,
Olmsted wrote of what he deemed the "common sense" approach to the ques-
tion of impairment. 7 An editorial had appeared shortly before in the journal
American Forests, arguing that, were a decision made "to subordinate the
principles of National Park conservation to principles of economic exploitation
within the limits of the Rocky Mountain National Park," then the park would
lose the central value by which it was worthy of national park status, and that
the land should be withdrawn and transferred to the Forest Service as a Na-
tional Forest. The editorial further suggested that any diminution of the park's
natural scene should lead to the transfer of the entire park, not merely of the
portion visibly affected by the Colorado-Big Thompson irrigation project.
While Olmsted found this reaction excessive, it is instructive to note that
he had clear criteria in mind by which he would define a rational position on
the question of invasions of the park in relation to water needs outside the
park. First, he argued that a stand on "absoluteness" was not "sane" in a
"world of relativities," acknowledging that an absolutely unbending position
would lose support for the park since the Park Service would appear to be
opposing a goal that was "for the good of society." Second, he thought that an
unduly "academic conception" (in this case, of landownership "as extending
vertically from the center of the earth indefinitely upward into space") would
be, and would be seen to be, non-rational. Third, he specifically argued that a
tunnel a mile below the surface would not necessarily or invariably inflict
harm on the park; rather, the test to be applied should be one of the "probable
57. Letter from Olmsted to Bradford Williams (Oct. 22, 1937) (on file with the Library of
Cong., American Soc'y of Landscape Architects).
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degree of its adverse influences." Fourth, not content with so general an argu-
ment, he proposed actual criteria, in keeping with the original intentions of the
Organic Act, that should be applied when issues of this nature arose.
Olmsted proposed five criteria. 1) The burden of proof-"and thoroughly
well-considered and convincing proof -must rest upon the advocates of "any
enterprise for non-park purposes within the theoretical limits of jurisdiction of
a National Park"; 2) the enterprise must be of "real social importance from a
national [italics added] standpoint and is not to be practically attainable" else-
where; 3) the enterprise must not "endanger the value of the park for its
proper purposes to the slightest appreciable degree"; 4) the danger must be "so
slight and of such a nature that the land if subject to it in advance would nev-
ertheless have been wisely considered eminently suitable for selection and
permanent maintenance as a National Park"; and 5) the non-park purpose must
be "of so much more importance nationally than the purposes of the park" as
to justify the lessening of the park. Olmsted concluded that, while he was
open to reason, he did not find the arguments for the Colorado-Big Thompson
Project complete or convincing.
Of course, Olmsted's reasoning was not law (and this expression of his
view came over twenty years after he had drafted the 1916 preamble). Con-
gress and the President, in their wisdom, did in due course approve the Colo-
rado-Big Thompson project. 8
Congressman Kent's Views
What did the principal formal author of the National Park Act of 1916,
Congressman William Kent, say about it himself? Kent often is singled out as
the "father of the National Park System," and his views deserve some extend-
ed analysis.59
Kent was a Chicago businessman who had bought a home in Marin Coun-
ty, California, in 1899 and moved there in 1907. He was adding to an already
substantial fortune through land in California and in Nevada. A Progressive,
he had stood with Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, and after 1912 he was a
somewhat ambiguous independent supporter of Woodrow Wilson. Elected to
Congress in 1910, he brought with him a reputation as a conservationist, and
he quickly went on record in favor of public power. He wished to see the
nation's flooding rivers brought under control, advocated extensive irrigation
projects for California's Owens Valley, strongly supported public water power
projects on the Suwanee, the Susquehanna, and the Mississippi rivers, and was
an early proponent of the Tennessee Valley Authority. As he championed
public power, he also opposed private power, and he was particularly ambiva-
58. See C.W. BUCKHOLTz, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NATIONAL PARK: A HISTORY 188-91 (1983).
59. The Kent Papers are in the Sterling Memorial Library at Yale University. I have also
examined his correspondence with his son Sherman Kent, later director of the Office. of National
Estimates at the Central Intelligence Agency (these papers are under restricted access at the Yale
University Library), and inquired of the family, through Mrs. Sherman Kent, and through a grand-
son, whether any papers remain at the family home in Kentfield, California, to which the answer
was no.
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lent toward a bill put forward by his colleague on the Committee on the Pub-
lic Lands, Congressman Scott Ferris of Oklahoma. This bill, H.R. 16673, came
before Congress in January, 1915, to authorize the Secretary of the Interior to
lease to American citizens "for purposes of constructing dams, water controls,
reservoirs, transmission box lines" ".any part of the public lands... including
lands in. national forests, the Grand Canyon and Mount Olympus national
monuments, and other reservations, not including national parks" for a period
of fifty years. Kent vigorously opposed this bill, pouncing upon its reference
to the Grand Canyon, and even though Ferris added the provision that leases
were to be granted only if they were not inconsistent with the purpose for
which a national park or national monument was created, Kent remained ada-
mant. Water, Kent maintained, should belong to the people.'
A second consistent strain in his thought was revealed in his persistent
efforts to transfer to public ownership a large area of Mt. Tamalpais, in Marin
County. Kent owned much of the mountain and an outstanding grove of coast-
al redwoods that nestled in one of its valleys, and beginning shortly after his
arrival in California he had wished to see this land become a state park or, as
later phrased, national monument-the first national monument having been
created by executive action at Devil's Tower, Wyoming, in 1906-in part
because the growing population of Matin County was creating pressure for
more water, and he wanted both to protect the purity of the watershed and to
assure the towns of the county an adequate public water supply. In 1908 he
was successful in these endeavors, and his redwood grove became Muir
Woods National Monument. From 1903 forward he spoke of the need for
more national parks and the necessity to keep lands in or destined for parks
out of local politics.
Thus Kent favored the development of water power through public means,
the protection of watersheds, and the creation of national parks and monu-
ments to preserve scenic and natural areas. At Muir Woods he was insistent
on the highest standards of protection, and the early wardens, who were in his
pay, even kept local societies that had been accustomed to walking in the park
to "botanize"--the contemporary term for taking plants for educational purpos-
es, pressing them in "flower books," and identifying them-from picking wild
flowers. At Muir Woods, he wrote all was to be left natural, with no plants to
be removed and no naturally downed trees to be cleaned up from the valley
floor.6 He also proposed a park for Lake Tahoe, on which he was unable to
obtain effective support.
As a member of Congress, Kent was not dogmatic on the water issue,
save for his insistence on public power, and he was not invariably a supporter
of undisturbed wilderness even in national parks. After all, he was among
those who pressed for opening up Yosemite National Park to the Hetch
Hetchy reservoir, for he felt constrained to put the water needs of his Bay
60. William Kent Papers (on file with Yale University Library, R. Group 309, box 71, folder
125).
61. Id. (box 25, folder 499).
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Area constituents first.62 For whatever reason, he was silent on water issues
when both the 1915 and 1916 park service bills were introduced, though in
1913, during an early discussion of Rocky Mountain National Park, he ob-
served that scenic judgments were subjective and that he preferred a "mirror
lake" to a mud flat.63
Kent's views on what a national park should be had been made clear,
however, across several park proposals. In 1913 he had offered up a national
monument on the Middle Fork of the Feather River in northern California and
a Redwood National Park on the California north coast and in January, 1915,
he had come out strongly in House debate for the Rocky Mountain National
Park bill, declaring that the preservation of scenery is a "most valuable pur-
pose." He drew a distinction between national forest, national monument, and
national park land, asserting that a national park must be held "in a state of
nature" and that animal life must be "forever free from molestation." One
may reasonably conclude that this was still his view only a year later, as spon-
sor of H.R. 8668.
Kent's position thus seems clear. He promoted his own park bill because
he thought it, and not Raker's, would pass and also because it was the better
bill. It contained Olmsted's preamble and Raker's had none. In close touch
with President Wilson, Kent was cautioning him weekly on the need to keep
the United States out of the war that had broken out in Europe, and he intend-
ed to withdraw from the Congressional race in the first district of California
(though he postponed an official announcement until June to allow for an
appropriate successor to test the waters) because of ill health. Thus, he also
felt a sense of urgency in getting the bill to the President. For reasons of
health, Kent's focus on his bill clearly declined after it was reported out of
committee in May, but he could well feel he had made his position abundantly
clear already, and he knew that Senator Smoot would carry the bill in the
Senate.
During this time letters poured in from a wide range of constituents, orga-
nizations state and national, and fellow members of Congress, praising him for
his park bill. Examples of letters of commendation and support received in
March of 1916 alone include the Washington State Federation of Women's
Clubs, Seattle Daily Times, Fortuna (CA) Women's Civic Club, City Shade
Tree Commission of York, PA, College Women's Club of San Diego, the
Henry Street Settlement in New York City, The Appalachian Club, Tramp and
Trail Club, Erie (PA) Board of Commerce, Corona Club of San Francisco,
Twentieth Century Club of Berkeley, California Development Board, Hebrew
Educational Society of Brooklyn, Los Angeles City Teachers' Club, Miss
Haskell's School of Boston, National Magazine, American Society of Land-
scape Architects, South Bend (IN) Chamber of Commerce, Highland Park
Ebell of Los Angeles, and Herbert W. Gleason of Boston (a lecturer on
62. Id. (box 67, folders 83-85).
63. Id. (folders 86-91).
64. Id. (Scrapbook B, microfilm reel 4, §§ 8-10).
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parks).
65
Kent was particularly concerned with standards, and with the rumor that
the chief forester, Henry S. Graves, was opposed to his bill, and on this he
sought out assurances. Graves responded to Kent on March 17, declaring that
he fully favored the bill. The Department of the Interior was facing pressure
for economic use of natural resources in the parks and chose to meet this by
granting grazing privileges similar to the national forests. This would affect
the forests too, and as we have seen, Graves wanted to see a national park
service created so that a national park would be clearly distinct from a nation-
al forest, "almost wholly protective," set aside to preserve "exceptional natural
wonders," "segregated," for "exclusively ... recreation and scenic purposes."
The goal was to "preserve these areas in their natural condition." Congress
must, Graves concluded, be certain that national parks are "really distinctive"
and then hold them to a higher standard than other public lands, with the pro-
posed National Park Service to have "its own separate and distinct field.
'"
Nothing could have seemed clearer, and Kent and Graves were in agree-
ment that precisely because a higher standard was to be applied to national
parks, one must resist the growing demand at the local level to create parks
primarily to attract tourists. Graves noted that there were fifteen or more bills
pending to create new parks; many of the bills would not prohibit industrial
use and would authorize grazing, mineral development, the sale of timber or
the use of streams for water power. This must not happen, he said, and Kent
agreed. Late in 1916, Kent was unhappy with power companies in the Mono
Lake Valley for obtaining rights under the guise of irrigation, and for being al-
lowed to effect a change in the Yosemite Park line, to the loss of two mag-
nificent waterfalls.67
Had Kent intended any emphasis on recreational purposes for the
parks-one of the purposes to which Graves referred-he surely would have
said so, for at the time Kent was a Vice President of the Playground and Rec-
reation Association of America. Had he believed that he could leave interpre-
tation of the bill to the Secretary of the Interior, Frederick K. Lane, he surely
would not have written to Woodrow Wilson on July 24, when the bill was
soon to be on the President's desk, advising him that Interior was abandoning
sound policy. The Assistant Secretary, A.A. Jones, was not to be trusted, and
Lane himself "had broken down to a considerable extent in his conservation
policies. '
65. Id. (box 24, folders 468-72).
66. Letter from Henry S. Graves, Chief Forester [hereinafter Graves], to William Kent, Con-
gressman, [hereinafter Kent] (Mar. 17, 1916) (William Kent Papers, supra note 51 (box 24, folder
470)).
67. Letter from Wallis D. McPherson to Kent (Dec. 14, 1916) (William Kent Papers, supra
note 51 (box 25, folder 507)).
68. Letter from Kent to Woodrow Wilson, President, (July 24, 1916) (William Kent Papers,
supra, note 51 (box 25 folder 493)); see also William Kent Papers, supra, note 51 (folder 500).
Lane's views were, indeed, moving more toward commerce than conservation in 1916, but on the
national park bill itself he remained supportive. The sparse Lane Papers at the Library of Congress
do not help us here, nor does TiE LE'rERs OF FRANKLIN K. LANE: PERSONAL AND POLrTCAL
(Anne Wintermute Lane & Louise Herrick Hall, eds. 1922). Having had a heart attack, Lane was
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Until his death William Kent tracked the national parks. In 1922 he
marked a passage in an article by Barton Warren Evermann, that "National
parks should be maintained as natural parks and not be marred by artificiality
of any avoidable kind." In 1925, when a Senate Subcommittee of the Com-
mittee on the Public Lands held hearings on the national forests, Arno B.
Cammerer, Assistant Director of the National Park Service, appeared before it,
and Kent noted his remarks with approval. Cammerer asserted that the parks
"were established to be kept absolutely in their natural condition," except for
roads and hotels: it was, he felt, preferable to lose land and change boundaries
than to permit an incompatible act within a park. ° Reservoirs, for example,
were clearly incompatible, Cammerer noted, pointing out that Congress had,
by amendment to the Federal water power act of 1920, gone on record that
before any ditches, reservoirs, etc., could go into any national park, they
would have to be specifically authorized by an act of Congress. Kent appears
to have felt that his basic principles had at last been clearly recognized.
A Contradictory Mandate?
Several commentators on the National Park Service Act of 1916 have
concluded that the preamble, or statement of fundamental purpose, presented
the Service with a contradictory mandate. There are three possible sources of
contradiction: doubt as to whether the 1916 act applied to parks existing be-
fore that time; conflict between federal agencies; and ambiguities in the lan-
guage of the act. The first two possible sources of conflict do not arise, for
Congress was clear with respect to them. In the debates on the bill, Senator
Reed Smoot of Utah, sponsor in the Senate, specifically said that the bill was
intended to apply to the then existing parks.7' In the Committee Report ac-
companying the 1916 bill, Congress noted that there was not supposed to be
any conflict of jurisdiction among the agencies.72 Thus, if the new National
Park Service was handed a contradictory mandate by Congress, the contradic-
tion arose from the language of the bill, and in particular from its statement of
"fundamental purpose." Whether such a contradiction exists or not now re-
quires further examination."
not vigorous and would die in 1921. The only biography, KErrH W. OLSON, BIOGRAPHY OF A
PROGRESSIVE: FRANKLIN K. LANE, 1864-1921 (1979), is silent on parks. An unpublished M.A.
thesis that apparently shows access to additional materials, Henry W. Wiens, The Career of Frank-
lin K. Lane in California Politics (1936) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of California), has
been reported lost by the Berkeley institution.
69. Dr. Barton Warren Evermann, Conservation and Proper Utilization of Our Natural Re-
sources, Sci. MONTHLY, OCL 1922, at 293, 294 (emphasis in original).
70. William Kent Papers, supra note 51 (April 1925) (pamphlet file (copy)).
71. 64 CONG. REc. 12,151 (1916).
72. H.R. REP. No. 700, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916).
73. Many standard books on the National Park Service, or in conservation or environmental
history, devote a paragraph or so to the act, usually in much the same language. When one pur-
sues these paragraphs through the references supplied, one finds a nearly infinite regression, each
leaning upon the previous secondary statement, most virtually devoid of any independent exami-
nation. For the most part these accounts pass over the actual framing of the bill and raise no
questions about Congressional intent, simply celebrating (in words attributed to Wallace Stegner)
"the best idea America ever had." Perhaps half the secondary works conclude that the preamble to
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These recent commentators ask, in one form or another, how a manage-
ment policy can both accommodate use and preserve a natural area. These
commentators, often in very similar terms, conclude that the Park Service was
presented by the act with a "fundamental dilemma," that the Service was
asked to attempt "harmonizing the unharmonizable," and that the dilemma is
not capable of either logical or historical resolution.74 None of these authors
appears to have examined the bills that led to the Act of 1916, the hearings,
the debates-that is to say, the legislative history-much less having sought
out and explored the private papers of the members of the Committee on the
Public Lands.
To accept the conclusion that the preamble presented the Park Service
with an inherent contradiction, that it is illogical, is to conclude that Congress
had no clear intent, that it either did not know what it was doing when it
posed a dilemma, that it did not care, or that there is no inherent contradiction
in the preamble. While Congressional acts undeniably contain unclear lan-
guage, and (when acted upon administratively) unresolved issues, it seems
unreasonable to so summarily dismiss Congressional intent when the act was
the product of well-informed men, especially Raker and Kent, both of whom
had studied the issue with care, one of whom declared the act to be his "pet"
and the other, by evidence of his correspondence, having spent much time
upon it; when the act was the last of a series, each of which had benefitted
from the clarification of hearings; when the co-sponsor in the senate, Reed
Smoot, confided to his diary that this act was one of the most important of his
accomplishments;75 and when such careful and scholarly individuals as Fred-
erick Law Olmsted and Robert B. Marshall had a hand in its language.
We have Raker's testimony to the importance he attached to this legisla-
tion. Though his papers apparently have not survived 6 in public hands, we
know that Raker (and Kent) met regularly in 1916 at the apartment of Robert
the act contains a "logical contradiction" (the words of Ronald A. Foresta in RONALD A.
FOREsTA, AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR KEEPERS 100 (1984)), or appears to. How-
ever, not one of these books or articles is based on an examination of the Kent, Olmsted, or other
relevant papers, and Swain's 1966 article, supra note 8, on which most of the recent writings are
based, is drawn almost wholly from the papers of Horace Albright, secondary accounts, and a
limited survey of Congressional Debates and Interior Department annual reports, with no reference
to Congressional Hearings or other manuscript collections.
74. Upon examination more recently, this conclusion is often cited to an unpublished
Master's thesis, Daniel McCool, The National Park Service: The Politics of Appropriations (1980)
(unpublished M. thesis, University of Arizona), which is in fact about funding rather than purpose;
or from political scientists and sociologists whose primary inquiry is into the theory of manage-
ment. A check of five frequently quoted articles shows that not one of the authors went beyond
what they construed to be the common sense meaning of the language, which they found on the
face of it contradictory. However, if one is to construe, deconstruct, or (as an historian) explicate a
text, one generally may not do so without going behind the text.
75. Diary of Reed Smoot (July 11, Aug. 6, 1916) (Reed Smoot Papers, on file with Brigham
Young University). See also his biographical sketch (which he himself wrote) in 35 THE NATION-
AL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 63-64 (1949).
76. The Congressional Information Office has found no papers. This writer called all major
depositories in California, the local historical societies of Susanville and Alturas (where Raker had
his law offices), the alumni office of San Jose State University (from which he graduated in 1884,
when it was a normal school), and a variety of repositories in Washington, DC, where he died in
1926, all without success.
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Sterling Yard, a journalist working for the United States Geological Survey in
Washington, and that the final bill was drafted by these men, joined by three
officers of the American Civic Association, McFarland, Richard B. Watrous,
and Henry A. Barker; by Enos Mills, Huston Thompson (the Assistant Attor-
ney General), Gilbert Grosvenor, editor of The National Geographic Maga-
zine, Emerson Hough, a leading exponent of reforestation, and Herbert Quick
of the Saturday Evening Post. Except for Mills, who was popularly dubbed
"the father of Rocky Mountain National Park," which had been created by act
of Congress earlier in 1915, these men were professional publicists, editors of
travel and outdoors oriented magazines, or officers of similarly inclined asso-
ciations. As noted earlier, McFarland and Watrous would testify at the 1916
hearings on the National Park Service Act. Yard had been editor of Century
Magazine and of the Sunday magazine of the New York Herald, but he had
recently come to Washington to be head of any future national parks informa-
tion office, and he was writing a booklet on the parks. (Stephen Mather, future
director of the National Park Service, had arranged for Yard to be employed
through the Geological Survey, since there was as yet no park bureau that
could hire him.77).
Once Kent agreed to sponsor a new parks bill, these men moved their
meetings to his home on F Street in Washington, where they met "fairly regu-
larly," according to the young Horace Albright," who was Mather's assistant
and a regular member of the group. He recalled Kent, McFarland, Marshall,
and Yard as the core group, with Olmsted, Grosvenor, Quick, Hough, Barker,
Watrous, and Mills present from time to time. Thus there was reasonable con-
tinuity of attendance at these meetings. It seems unlikely that such a group,
even though they wanted a simple and uncluttered bill and wished it in a hur-
ry, would allow a glaring contradiction to be part of the statement of "funda-
mental purpose" over which Olmsted labored, producing at least three ver-
sions. One must presume that the language was deliberate and that it is worthy
of the closest attention.
Not present at the F Street meetings was Stephen Mather himself. Mather
had brought Yard to Washington and had persuaded Albright to give up a
career in the law to be his assistant; a rich man, he paid both out of his own
pocket, an unusual but not illegal arrangement. Mather had taken pains to get
to know the people who ran the national parks, by calling a national park
conference for Berkeley, California, in March of 1915, and asking all park
superintendents to attend. He also had invited most of the concessionaires
from the parks and took with him from Washington several key players. One
member of the House Committee on the Public Lands, Denver S. Church of
Fresno, California, had attended. At Berkeley, Mather had spoken of the need
for a park service and had shared with Albright his sense that many of the
77. ALBRIGHT & KAHN, supra note 38, at 24; see also ROBERT SHANKLAND, STEVE
MATHER OF THE NATIONAL PARKS 100-01 (2d ed. 1954). I have examined the Mather Papers, in
the Bancroft Library of the University of California, Berkeley, but do not cite to them here since
all relevant quotations and statements drawn from them in Shankland, or Albright and Calm, are
accurate, and citation to the more readily available source is preferable.
78. ALBRIGHT & CAHN, supra note 38, at 35.
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superintendents, being political appointees, were not up to their tasks, a defi-
ciency a park service would remedy.
Mather also took the trouble to get to know the key members of the
House and Senate committees. He was on social terms with Congressmen
Kent, Raker, Carl Hayden, Addison Smith, and Louis C. Cramton of Michi-
gan, all members of the Committee on the Public Lands, as well as with Sena-
tors Smoot and Norris. He talked with them about the need for a service,
shared with them his philosophy of what the parks should be, and urged them
to move forward as quickly as possible with a new bill. Kent did so at a time
when Raker was ill, mindful of the fact that his California colleague was un-
popular and maladroit on the floor of the House, as well as disliked by the
House minority leader, James R. Mann, who came from Kent's former district
in Illinois. Thus the working group got behind Kent's bill quickly, knowing
that it had a far greater prospect of being reported out of committee than
Raker's bill did.
Finally, it was Mather who orchestrated the presence of powerful journal-
ists at the planning meetings on F Street. He took a party into Sequoia Na-
tional Park in July of 1915, including local newspaper editors, natural scien-
tists, the head of the American Museum of Natural History, the ranking Re-
publican on the House Appropriations Committee, the vice-president of the
Southern Pacific Railroad, photographers, magazine writers, and travel editors.
Following this visit to Sequoia and the Kings River and Kern River canyons,
Mather and Albright brought a number of national magazines into line, and
then promoted meetings at the Yard and Kent residences. Given this careful
preparation, it is also unreasonable to assume that Mather would have allowed
a "logical contradiction" to emerge from Olmsted's pen.79
Mather testified during the hearings of April, 1916. He frequently noted
that an act was needed quickly, given uncertainties in Europe, and admitted
that from his perspective the bill did not deal in detail with all matters of
importance.' He did not pronounce upon the language of the Kent/Olmsted
preamble at the time, though in 1918 he agreed with Secretary of the Interior
Lane that the parks "must be maintained in absolutely unimpaired form." If he
believed this in 1918, he surely believed it in 1916, and it seems reasonable to
conclude that, given the care with which he orchestrated the shaping and pas-
sage of the Organic Act, he believed that the statement of "fundamental pur-
pose" supported his view.8'
We also have the commentary of two men who were consistently present
at the meetings in Yard's and Kent's residences. One was Robert Sterling
Yard himself. Early in 1916 Yard compiled a lengthy booklet, Glimpses of
Our National Parks, which he wished to get into public schools.82 He told
79. SHANKLAND, supra note 68, at 83-99; ALBRIGHT & CAHN, supra note 38, at 24-26;
Swain, supra note 8, at 8-15; DONALD C. SWAIN, WILDERNESS DEFENDER: HORAcE M. ALBRIGHT
AND CONSERVATION 41-60 (1970).
80. Hearing 1916, supra note 3, at 11-25.
81. On this early period see also JOHN C. MILES, GUARDIANS OF THE PARKS: A HISTORY OF
THE NATIONAL PARKS AND CONSERVATION AssocIATION 12-16 (1995).
82. ROBERT STERLING YARD, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INT., GLIMPSES OF OUR NATIONAL PARKS
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Kent there was a great demand in Congress for this publication, with many
members wanting 2500 copies while he could provide each with only 25, and
he asked Kent to sponsor a rider to an appropriations bill that would make the
booklet a public document. Glimpses would be transmuted by Yard first into a
substantial book of photographs with modest text, National Parks Portfolio,
and then, with greatly extended text, into The Book of the National Parks.3
In the last Yard wrote that "[o]riginally the motive in park-making had been
unalloyed conservation"; indeed, he used the controversial language, that Con-
gress had said it wished to "lock up" certain places. 4 However, after the cre-
ation of great parks such as Yellowstone and Yosemite, local pride had led to
the enactment of units "better fitted for State parks" (this was with reference
to Sullys Hill, Wind Cave, and Platt national parks), so that "the modem peri-
od" had followed, the period of "definite policy" represented by the act of
1916, after which parks had to be of "distinguished company" and embrace
"the nation's noblest landscapes and sites."
85
Horace Albright, likewise present at the creation, is the only one of those
who helped to talk out the proposed bill who would later explicitly confront
the presumed contradiction in the act. In his memoirs, published in 1985, he
noted that contrary to some scholars' accounts Olmsted did not write the full
bill itself, though he was "responsible for the wording of the governing sen-
tence," and that all present wanted the bill "to carry a clear definition of what
the Park Service should be." They were aware of the "inherent conflicts be-
tween use and preservation," he wrote-he did not say "contradiction"-but
they were facing the political reality that this issue could not be resolved by
the organic act alone. 6
National Park Services files at the National Archives reveal hundreds of
letters written by many dozens of organizations and individuals in favor of the
proposed National Park Service Act of 1916. These letters invariably focus, as
we have noted, on scenic values, road access, the quality of accommodations,
and the notion that the parks were the nation's playgrounds. The most prolific
correspondents were the officers and members of the American Civic Associa-
tion; and, as we have seen, three of those officers, McFarland, Watrous, and
Barker were present, the first almost always and the others less frequently, at
the meetings in Yard's apartment and Kent's house when the bill was drafted
and Olmsted completed his statement of "fundamental purpose." Thus their
voices are also entitled to be heard on the allegedly contradictory mandate.
McFarland commended Olmsted's preamble. "There is no better service
we can render to the masses of the people than to set about and preserve for
them wide spaces of fine scenery for their delight," he wrote. 7 In truth,
(1916).
83. ROBERT STERLING YARD, THE BOOK OF THE NATIONAL PARKS (1919).
84. Id. at 24.
85. Id. at 24-26.
86. ALBRIGHT & CAHN, supra note 38, at 35. In particular, see Albright's exchanges with
Huston Thompson. Horace Albright Papers (Feb. 23, 27, 1916, March 26, 1964 (typescript inter-
view)) (on file with University of California (Los Angeles)).
87. Letter from McFarland to Olmsted (Oct. 13, 1910) (Frederick Law Olmsted Papers, on
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McFarland had first drawn Olmsted into the cause, and the language of both
the House and, even more, the Senate bills from the first proposal in 1911 had
been deeply influenced by McFarland's views. Further, McFarland appears to
have persuaded Secretary of the Interior Ballinger as early as 1910 that
Olmsted was "the man who ought to do the thing that is in mind with relation
to these national parks"--that is, prepare a statement of purpose." Ballinger
had sent that portion of his 1910 annual report in which he proposed a nation-
al park bureau to McFarland for comment, and the American Civic Associa-
tion had immediately begun a public campaign. At McFarland's urging,
Olmsted had submitted directly to the Department of the Interior his first at-
tempt at a general statement to accompany the first draft bill. The statement in
the draft read:
That the parks, monuments, and reservations herein provided for shall
not at any time be used in any way detrimental or contrary to the
purpose for which dedicated or created by Congress.
Olmsted said this was not adequate and added to the bare bones section
the additional proviso that the parks, etc., should not be used in any way
contrary to "promoting public recreation and public health through the use and
enjoyment by the people ... of the natural scenery and objects of interest" in
the parks. Olmsted was particularly concerned that the word "scenery" be
inserted in connection with "natural" throughout the document. Olmsted sent
copies of this correspondence to McFarland.89
McFarland told Olmsted that he regarded him as "the wisest man in
America" on park subjects, and that his "conception of what a park is... "
was most important.' He argued Olmsted's view at the Yellowstone Park
conference of 1911, in correspondence with Ballinger, and consistently each
year thereafter, seeing to it that Olmsted was always in a prominent position to
comment on, and thus help shape, the language of any subsequent bills. The
Olmsted Papers, the Marshall and Mather manuscripts, and the files of the
National Park Service are filled with letters from McFarland, showing that he
remained carefully in touch with each development. Surely it is unlikely that
McFarland would have allowed the final product of all this effort, the Act of
1916, to contain a "fundamental statement" of purpose which he thought was
weak or contradictory?
Indeed, McFarland made his position clear in a heated interchange with
file with the Library of Congress) [hereinafter Olmsted Papers).
88. Letters from McFarland to Ballinger (Nov. 10, 12, 16, 1910, Jan. 3, 1911) (on file with
the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783); Letter from Ballinger to McFarland (Nov.
11, 1910) (on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783); Letter from
McFarland to Knute Nelson, Chairman, Senate Committee on the Public Lands (Jan. 4, 1911) (on
file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783); Letter from McFarland to
Ballinger (Dec. 22, 1910) (on file with the National Archives, R. Group 79, entry 6, box 23).
89. Letter from Olmsted to Frank Pierce, Acting Secretary of the Interior (Dec. 31, 1910)
(Olmsted Papers, supra note 78). This document, retyped, also appears in Olmstead [sic] Portfolio
(on file with the Bancroft Library, University of California (Berkeley)), and in the National Ar-
chives (R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783).
90. Letter McFarland to Olmsted (Sept. 5, 1911) (Olmsted Papers, supra note 78); see also
Olmstead Portfolio, supra note 80.
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Gifford Pinchot, the former head of the Forest Service, over the matter of the
Hetch Hetchy. Pinchot had implied that the initial framers of the park service
bill had a pecuniary interest in the parks and was reported to have said that
Interior was "where all the crooks are." This was an echo of his furious feud
with Ballinger, as well as a statement, about which he was equally direct,
concerning his conviction that the national parks should be administered by the
Forest Service, with parks to be "handled with the same government purpose
which must control" the National Forests. He also belittled McFarland's vi-
sion, suggesting that the American Civic Association simply wanted to apply
the methods of a city park to vast areas of wilderness, concluding that
McFarland did not know what a "park" was.9'
Pinchot's letter struck McFarland, who felt he quite clearly understood
what a park was, as arrogant and ill-informed. National Parks could not be
managed by individuals trained in "forest principles" only. The principles
governing national parks were quite different-he did not invoke the "higher
standard" argument in this response, as he would do later-and the National
Parks would not be safe in the hands of such a man as Pinchot. He attacked
Pinchot for having given up the "wonderful territory" of the Hetch Hetchy
Valley, violating a national park, without ever having personally viewed the
area. The implication was clear: that a Park Service was necessary to prevent
any future violations of this nature.'
To Chief Forester Graves, who he regarded as more sympathetic to a park
service, McFarland wrote that "a declaration of the real purpose of a National
Park" was important in order to correct misconceptions about a park as a
small or curried area. The purpose had to be "declared in unmistakable terms,"
and McFarland quoted Olmsted's draft.93 Of two Senate bills then proposed,
McFarland preferred the shorter one-this was Senator Smoot's bill-both
strategically and functionally, and he asked Smoot to insert in his bill, S.3463,
the section on purpose. Again, is it likely that a person of such persistence,
who regarded a general statement of purpose essential to any bill, and who
preferred a short bill with such a statement, would have thought the final lan-
guage used in the preamble to the Organic Act had created a logical contradic-
tion?
9 4
Other members of the House Committee on the Public Lands, and most
members of the Senate, were silent on the purposes of the Act of 1916,
speaking in hearings only to specific points, usually economic and financial, or
in debate in favor of the act or on whether grazing should be permitted in
parks. Edward T. Taylor of Colorado had made his views known the previous
91. Letter from Gifford Pinchot, former head of the Forest Service [hereinafter Pinchot] to
McFarland (Mar. 4, 1911) (Olmsted Papers, supra note 78).
92. Letter from McFarland 'to Pinchot (Mar. 6, 1911) (copy) (Olmsted Papers, supra note
78).
93. Letter from McFarland to Graves (Feb. 21, 1911) (R. Group 79, entry 6, McFarland file).
94. The bills were S.9816, S.3463, and H.R.32265, 61st Cong., 3d Sess. See Letter from
McFarland to Reed Smoot, Senator [hereinafter Smoot] (n.d.) (R. Group 79, entry 6, box 783);
Letter from McFarland to Olmsted (Jan. 18, 1911) (Olmstead Portfolio, supra note 80); Letter
from Richard B. Watrous, Secretary of the American Civic Association, [hereinafter Watrous] to
McFarland (Jan. 17, 1911) (Olmsted Papers, supra note 78).
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year during efforts to create the Rocky Mountain National Park, and he was
largely silent on the National Parks Act, other than commenting favorably on
the Colorado National Monument, created by executive act in 1911, which he
hoped might become Colorado's third national park, following Mesa Verde
and Rocky Mountain. Congressman Nicholas J. Sinnott of Oregon spoke up
only to express the hope that a proposed Park-to-Park Highway, which Ste-
phen Mather promoted during the 1916 hearings, would extend from Mount
Rainier through Oregon to California. While Congressman Irvine Lenroot of
Wisconsin was active throughout, he did not comment on general purposes or
standards, being primarily interested in the language that would assure the
Secretary of the Interior the authority to grant or deny leases. Congressman
Scott Ferris of Oklahoma, the chairman of the House committee in 1916, was
most interested in his own bill on water resources. Congressman Robert
LaFollette, usually vocal on any issue concerning the public interest, was plan-
ning to run for the presidency and appears to have attended only one of the
hearings. Floor debate was short, to the point, and no new light was thrown on
Congressional intent.
There is, as a final approach to the "contradictory mandate," the logic of
rhetoric. Many of those involved in framing the Organic Act, and certainly the
former judges, school teachers, and present Congressmen, were well accus-
tomed to the use of rhetoric, or the study of the effective use of language. As
rhetoricians, Senator Smoot and Congressmen Kent, Ferris,"' and Lenroot
were highly regarded. The classical education of the time-and Olmsted and
Raker had such an education-included rhetoric as a formal study. The princi-
ples of rhetoric held that, when listing two or more elements to an argument,
the most important be stated first, and when speaking in public debate, a sig-
nificant element of the argument which was not, however, the most significant,
should be stated last in order to allow for an "Attic fall." If the principles of
rhetoric were applied to the language of the preamble, then conserving "the
scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life" within a park
took precedence over providing for public "enjoyment," and there was no
contradiction between two elements of equal weight for the elements were not,
in fact, equal.
The Senate passed its bill on August 5. S. 9969, Reed Smoot's bill of
1911, was recycled in slightly altered form. While he was opposed to the
"socialism" of state promotion of water resources, Smoot was otherwise in
agreement with Kent on conservation matters. He wished to see more national
parks, in part because they preserved God's handiwork, in part because they
would bring visitors and better roads, and to that end he was pleased when it
was suggested that Mukuntuweap National Monument in the remote southwest
desert of Utah might become a national park, since he knew that dusty roads
deterred traffic. (In 1919 Mukuntuweap became Zion National Park.) Howev-
er, the Senate bill did contain one significant difference. At the insistence of
Senator Clarence D. Clark of Wyoming, who was fearful that references to
95. Congressman Ferris was a lay preacher. See his use of rhetoric in his scant papers, held
by the Museum of the Great Plains in Lawton, Oklahoma.
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grazing would mean that permits might be issued for Yellowstone, the bill had
no provision for grazing.
The need to reconcile the two bills meant further delay, though the public
band wagon mounted by McFarland and others had helped to carry bills for
three new parks-Sieur de Monts (later, Acadia), Hawaii, and Lassen Volca-
nic-while House and Senate conferred. Then the chairman of the Senate
public lands committee, Senator Henry L. Myers of Montana, and the House
chairman, Congressman Ferris, agreed to allow grazing in all national parks
with the explicit exception of Yellowstone. At the last minute a powerful
Congressman from Wisconsin, William Stafford, who opposed new bureaus on
principle, sought to bottle up the bill that had emerged from the conference
committee, and Kent was able to persuade him to stand down." Approval in
the Senate quickly followed.97
Explication of Text, 1916-1976
A recent historian of the national parks, Alfred Runte, has argued that
though Congress wished to create a "system" in 1916, there was still relatively
little awareness that this system involved more than setting aside lands that
had little or no prevailing economic value. Known as the "worthless lands"
thesis, Runte's argument is that Congress had not thought through such terms
as "unimpaired" or "enjoyment" largely because it imagined the parks would
not be the objects of commercial or industrial threats, since they were basical-
96. The papers of Clarence D. Clark, at the University of Wyoming, consist only of
scrapbooks. On Clark, see Albert G. Anderson, Jr., The Political Career of Senator Clarence D.
Clark (1953) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Wyoming). No Myers papers have survived
save for fugitive letters in the papers of Montana Senators Thomas J. Walsh and Burton K.
Wheeler at the Montana Historical Society in Helena and his death certificate at the Western Heri-
tage Center in Billings, Montana. There is a sketch of his career in the Billings Gazette of No-
vember 12, 1943. All efforts to locate the papers of Senator William Stafford failed.
In addition to the major collection of Smoot papers at Brigham Young University, there are
Smoot papers at the Library of Congress and at the Library of the University of West Virginia. An
article, the title of which offers promise-Thomas G. Alexander, Senator Reed Smoot and Western
Land Policy, 1905-1920, ARtz. AND WEST, Autumn 1971, at 245, 245-64--proved to contain only
passing references to the national park bill. The best biography is Milton R. Merrill, Reed Smoot:
Apostle in Politics (1950) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University). The other Sena-
tors who served on the Committee on the Public Lands and Surveys, or who spoke on the floor of
the Senate, were Colorado's John F. Shafroth and Charles S. Thomas, California's James D.
Phelan and John D. Works, and Thomas J. Walsh of Montana.
The writer was unable to examine the papers of the Coloradoans, Edward T. Taylor,
Charles B. Timberlake, John F. Shafroth, and Charles S. Thomas. The Taylor papers, at the Colo-
rado State Historical Society and the University of Colorado, were examined for him and revealed
nothing of relevance. Two collections might prove of value: the Thomas papers, which consist of
15,000 items, also at the Colorado State Historical Society, and the papers of Burton L. French, a
Congressman from Idaho, who interested himself in the act though he did not attend the hearings.
This last collection is at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio.
With respect to the NPS Act, the Papers of Woodrow Wilson, at Princeton University, are
silent (Arthur Link to writer, telephonic communication).
97. WnLAM C. EvERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERvicE 19-20 (1972), states that before
1915 only a "scattered few members of Congress" could have spoken on the national parks for
longer than five minutes. In 1916, debate in the Senate was almost nonexistent, but debate in the
House showed that a number of members had formulated views on what parks should and should
not be.
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ly worthless in economic terms, and that impairment was thus not likely to
occur, or if it did occur, such impairment would relate almost entirely to pro-
viding for "enjoyment," not to other issues.9"
Certainly there is some truth in this statement. Wild lands were, by 1916,
coming to be valued, but few people conceived that there would be any seri-
ous scarcity of them, and some people of exquisite urban sensitivities still held
to the view to be found in Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice, that mountains
were "horrid." Years earlier Frederick Law Olmsted (Sr.) had, while manager
of the Mariposa Estate and a frequent visitor to the Yosemite Valley, advocat-
ed the construction in that valley of graceful arched bridges in the manner of
Central Park in order to humanize the landscape; he hated "the wilderness &
wild," he wrote to his wife. In the 1890s, Senator Richard F. Pettigrew of
South Dakota said that Mount Tacoma (now Mount Rainier) "with its perpet-
ual snow and... rocky crags" was a "worthless land."
In this sense, and for the 1890s, Professor Runte's "worthless lands"
thesis is correct, though his argument tends to ignore the fact that by 1911
many in Congress attached economic value to park proposals for tourist pur-
poses and that others understood that as technologies changed, as old minerals
might be extracted at lower costs and new minerals be found, these "worthless
lands" would take on economic value. There is no convincing evidence that by
1916 the majority of legislators believed that they were protecting lands that
would be worthless for all time, and an abundance of evidence that virtually
all considered that the parks had commercial value as tourist attractions.
Nonetheless, the notion of useless or worthless lands may help to account
for why many in Congress felt no urgency to define the signifying terms with-
in Olmsted's draft. In 1915, Representative Edward T. Taylor of Colorado,
then a ranking member of the House Committee on the Public Lands, spoke of
the beauty of the proposed Rocky Mountain National Park, comparing it to
Switzerland, and said that it had "no value for anything but scenery." He was
careful to assuage the feelings of forestry and farming interests by stating that
the park would contain "little timber of merchantable value" and that its eleva-
tions were too high for farming."° Thus language was used in 1915-16
somewhat differently than we use it today.
While the crucial words from the preamble to the Organic Act of 1916
have traditionally been viewed as the statement of "fundamental purpose"
already examined here, there is other language in the act that requires consid-
98. ALFRED RuNTE, NATIONAL PARKS: TE AMEIuCAN EXPERIENCE (2d rev. ed. 1987). For
discussion of the "worthless lands" thesis, see Richard W. Sellars et al., The National Parks: A
Forum on the "Worthless Lands" Thesis, J. FOREST HIST., July 1983, at 130, 130-45. John C.
Freemuth has posed the question whether mineral extraction would be permitted from under the
water impounded behind a dam within a National Recreation Area, since such an area was not
created because of its inherent commercial worthlessness, the reservoir so impounded-and thus
proposed for possible violation-being an aspect of the worth of the area. See JOHN C.
FREEMUTH, ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE: NATIONAL PARKS AND THE POLmcs OF EXTERNAL THREATS
54 (1991).
99. Quoted in GuSTAvuS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE GREAT AMERICAN FORTUNES 223-24
n.23 (1936); see also ROBIN W. WINKS, FREDERICK BILLINGS: A LIFE 291 (1991).
100. 63 CONG. REc. 1,789-91 (1915).
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eration. Let us read the preamble again:
The service thus established shall promote and regulate the use of the
Federal areas known as national parks, monuments, and reservations
hereinafter specified... by such means and measures as conform to
the fundamental purpose of the said parks, monuments, and reserva-
tions, which purpose is to conserve the scenery and the natural and
historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoy-
ment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave
them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations.'
Thus, the primary goal of the new Service is to "leave" the parks and monu-
ments unimpaired, placing clear priority on protection as opposed to restora-
tion of landscapes and by implication arguing for a presumption of inaction in
the face of any request for what may be viewed as "impairment." Arguably
any action taken prior to passage of the Organic Act that might be viewed as
impairment represented an action that could be, in so far as possible, undone,
reversed, or nullified.
But what of "shall promote and regulate" in reference to the parks and
monuments? Here arises the true source of the dichotomy of purpose, between
preservation and use, conservation and enjoyment."H It may well be argued
that the order in which these two objectives are set forth, as well as the se-
quence by which taken together they precede other terms in the statement, is
significant, with "enjoyment" circumscribed by "unimpaired."'0 3 The legisla-
tive history of the act would appear to support this view, and successive Di-
rectors of the National Park Service, and for the most part Secretaries of the
Interior, as well as chairpersons of the relevant committees and subcommittees
in Congress, have usually acted in such a manner as to suggest that the Park
Service's first priority should be preservation.
The "governing sentence" and the sections that follow are silent on ques-
tions of water or timber use, and one must infer intent from that which is said.
In a circular letter to his colleagues on April 27, Kent supplied the amended
bill as reported out following the mid-April hearings. He drew attention to its
provisions."° Cutting of timber was to be permitted only in order to control
insect attack or disease or to conserve the scenery or the natural or historic
objects: that is, one resource that was specified was to be altered only with a
view to conservation purposes. While permits could be granted for use of the
land, these permits were to be "only for the accommodation of visitors in the
101. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (emphasis added).
102. On this point see THoMAs J. CAROLAN, JR., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE PoLncAL DY-
NAMICS OF THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (1980-81), especially pages 2-5.
103. The act refers to "enjoyment" by "future generations," not to "the people," which intro-
duces an expectation of changing definitions of "enjoyment" by reference to the future. This
makes legitimate an examination of changing perceptions relating to the signifying terms in the
statement of purpose. Significantly, "the people" are acknowledged not to be static. Even were the
term used in its customarily monolithic way, courts have interpreted "the people"-as in decisions
involving the right to bear arms, for example-to mean the people as a group not as individuals,
thus opening the way to barring certain individuals. The same is true of use of grandfathered
privileges within a park: they might apply to "the people" but not necessarily to any given person.
104. William Kent Papers, supra note 51 (box 24, folder 476).
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various parks," so that land grants were to be denied save to meet the needs of
accommodation. "No natural curiosities, wonders or objects of interest" could
be leased, rented, or granted on terms that would "interfere with free access to
them by the public," which placed the public interest first while permitting
rental or lease that presumably went beyond accommodation, to which grants
were limited. The Secretary could grant grazing rights when they were not
detrimental to "the primary purpose" of a park, which was enjoyment by the
people and preservation of wild life and natural features. Section 6 declared
that all acts or parts of acts "inconsistent herewith" were repealed.
The intent of Congress as expressed in 1916 must also be seen as modi-
fied in light of the acts of 1970 and 1976. The act of 1970 introduces some-
what revised language, for unlike the act of 1916, it does refer to "the people."
The act arose in the context of a growing concern for recreational opportuni-
ties in the United States, recognized by the Outdoor Recreation Resources
Review Commission appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, which
reported to President John F. Kennedy in 1962."° In 1970, President Richard
M. Nixon's "Legacy of the Parks" program held that the government should
be "taking parks to the people," an idea which was supported on a bipartisan
basis in Congress. The result was the Act of August, 1970, which in addition
to reasserting the significance of the national parks, remarked upon their "in-
creased national dignity" both "individually and collectively," so that an in-
fringement upon the dignity of one was an infringement upon the dignity of
all. This, some commentators thought, meant that each park superintendent had
the responsibility to act aggressively with respect to threats against his or her
unit rather than awaiting a directive by the Director of the National Park Ser-
vice.
Less commented upon, but important, is the language by which "the peo-
ple" are invoked: the parks, which must represent "superb environmental qual-
ity," also acquire their significance by virtue of their "inclusion jointly with
each other in one national park system preserved and managed for the benefit
and inspiration of all the people." In addition to the explicit citation to the
people, the act added to the linked criteria of 1916, unimpaired preservation
and access for enjoyment, the new, if parallel, concepts of "inspiration" and
"benefit." As these words are at least as open to subjective interpretation as
were those of 1916, they gave rise to renewed debate.
However, "benefit" and "inspiration" need not be placed in opposition to
each other. The context makes clear that "inspiration" refers to the re-creation
of the spirit that comes from gazing upon or walking amidst a sublime scene,
or from examining an historical remnant relating to an event or achievement
presumably inspiring to most Americans; it may, of course, also refer to the
"inspiration" that arises from the healthy use of recreational outlets, mastery
over one's body, or simply a sense of well-being. Indeed, since Congress pro-
ceeded to create, under the 1970 act, a number of new National Recreation
Areas, including so-called "urban parks," at the least this reading seems es-
105. See ROBIN W. WINKS, LAURANCE S. ROCKEFELLER: CATALYST FOR CONSERVATION
(Washington's Island Press (1997)), on the significance of the Review Commission.
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sential. It does not follow, however, that "recreation" was given priority over
"re-creation." The 1970 act clearly strengthened the Congressional mandate
placed upon the Park Service to protect park units in the fullest sense of the
word.
"Benefit" requires less parsing, though in conjunction with "the people" it
does require a textual comment. As stated, this linkage had not been made
explicit in previous legislation. By the linkage, Congress appears to have been
saying that management principles must look to actions that would benefit "all
the people" (indeed, the 1970 act used precisely this language) rather than
decisions that would redound primarily to the benefit of a minority, be it local,
an interest group, or an ethnic community. Thus guidance was given to the
Park Service to exercise the broad powers it either possessed or would acquire
over the next decade.
The act of 1970 also expanded the definition of the Park System to in-
clude "any area of land and water now or hereafter administered by the Sec-
retary of the Interior through the National Park Service for park, monument,
historic, parkway, recreational, or other purposes." While this provision was
directed to the concept of national seashores, national lakeshores, and wild and
scenic rivers, no distinction of this nature was made in the act itself, and thus
the language is quite sufficiently broad to admit of all water and land resourc-
es within a park."°
In Section 8 of the Act of October, 1976, Congress directed the Secretary
of the Interior to "investigate, study and continually monitor the welfare of
areas whose resources exhibit qualities of national significance and which may
have potential for inclusion in the National Park System." While this section
did not, as some critics suggested, lessen the actual criteria for inclusion in the
system, it did lead to many new additions; more important is the fact that it
also gave the Secretary an essential advisory authority on resource issues out-
side the boundaries of any of the existing parks. From this it was a short step,
through four key acts already on the books-the Wilderness Act of 1964, Wild
and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, Clean Water Act of 1972, and Endangered
Species Act of 1973-to charging other government agencies with cooperating
with the National Park Service.
In the 1970s, the Park System grew at a nearly unprecedented rate, espe-
cially under the impetus of Representative Phillip Burton of California. As
Chairman of the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Insular Affairs,
Burton required that twelve potential park proposals be reviewed each year.
Thus Congress took over an initiatory r6le, not waiting for the Park Service to
propose units. As Congress increasingly took primary responsibility for the
creation of new units, in view of what it regarded as a default on this respon-
sibility by the Executive Branch and the Park Service, dozens of acts were
106. One may well argue that in creating national recreation areas, national seashores, national
lakeshores, and other more clearly recreational units, Congress was intending to put distance be-
tween the National Parks, unqualified by any adjective, and other types of units, thus suggesting a
preference for the strictest application of protection to the National Parks, so called, as distinct
from the other designations.
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passed. While each of these was specific to a unit, some contained varied
language concerning that unit, or on occasion units collectively. It is an inter-
esting question (and a nightmarish one), therefore, as to whether in order to
interpret or understand the intent of Congress today one needs to examine
each of the nearly four hundred individual acts in search of language that
would effect the collectivity."
A NOTE ON SOME SUBSEQUENT LEGAL INTERPRETATIONS OR ACTIVITY
OUTSIDE THE PARKS: WATER BY WAY OF EXAMPLE
The Organic Act establishing the National Park Service in 1916 provided
that the National Park Service (NPS) was to "conserve the scenery and the
natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the
enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them
unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations. ' '""a This act was amend-
ed in 1970 and in 1978-those amendments are found at 16 U.S.C. § la-I
(1994). The purpose of those amendments was to reiterate the NPS's duty to
maintain and protect parks in the spirit of the 1916 act. As we have seen, none
of these statutes provides any scheme for how the NPS is supposed to fulfill
the lofty objectives in the statutes.'"
I have tracked how courts have interpreted these statutes. A vast majority
of cases involve challenges to NPS regulation within parks. With a few excep-
tions courts overwhelmingly defer to the discretion of the NPS to regulate
within the parks in carrying out the mandates of the legislation." ' This clos-
ing note will, therefore, focus on the more difficult question of power to con-
trol or affect activity outside the parks.
Some courts, even before 1916, have held that the Secretary of the Interi-
or has a trust obligation to protect public lands. In Knight v. United Land
Ass'n, the Supreme Court said that the Secretary of the Interior is the
guardian of the people of the United States over the public lands. The extent
107. This writer is attempting precisely this task for a work in progress, The Rise of the Na-
tional Park Ethic (forthcoming).
108. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
109. In 1946 Congress also gave the NPS the power (financially) to acquire rights in accor-
dance with local customs or laws if "necessary or beneficial in the administration" of the National
Parks and Monuments. 16 U.S.C. §17j-2(g) (1994).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Vogler, 859 F.2d. 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that the NPS
can require permits to transport off-road vehicles through park land in Alaska); Wilderness Pub.
Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that the NPS can allocate commer-
cial and non-commercial boating on Colorado River); Town of Beverly Shores v. Lujan, 736 F.
Supp. 934 (N.D. Ind. 1989) (stating that the NPS can pave parking area at Indiana Dunes, balanc-
ing natural preservation with public access). For an example of a case where NPS regulations
were held invalid, see Wilkenson v. Dep't of interior, 634 F. Supp. 1265 (D. Colo. 1986) (holding
that the NPS could not charge fee for travel through Colorado National Monument because roads
through the park were a public right of way, being State Highway 340, a portion of the only all-
weather road to the settlement of Glade Park). I choose court decisions concerning water rights, as
these, together with grazing and the extraction of minerals, were at issue in all early park legisla-
tion, and access to water is more nearly a universal question throughout all types of National Park
System units than questions relating to grazing or mineral extraction are likely to be. I wish to
thank Janet Satterthwaite for assistance with this note.
11. 142 U.S. 161 (1891).
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of this duty was highlighted in litigation involving Redwood National Park in
the 1970s. The unique legislation that created the park in 1968 contemplated
that problems would arise from external logging and gave the NPS the author-
ity to acquire interests in land outside the park to minimize ecological damage
within the park."' The Sierra Club sued the NPS to force the NPS to exer-
cise this power."3 Courts will usually overturn an agency's exercise of dis-
cretion only upon a showing of abuse of that discretion. Nevertheless, after
reviewing the evidence, the court ordered the NPS to exercise its power to ac-
quire interests in land outside the park.
Although the court in the Redwood cases relied on the unique statute
creating the park, the case nevertheless has implications for other parks. The
court also invoked the general duties under 16 U.S.C. § 1 and a general trust
obligation of the NPS to protect parks." 4 The court noted that the NPS had
failed to "exercise and perform duties imposed upon them by [16 U.S.C. § 11
and the Redwood National Park Act ... and duties otherwise imposed on
them by law.""' (After the Department of the Interior had submitted reports
to the court, the court found that the Department was attempting to comply
with the law.)" 1
6
After the Redwood litigation, Congress passed another statute for Red-
wood National Park. To clarify the confusion over the duties of the NPS gen-
erally, Congress added a rider to the statute to reinforce 16 U.S.C. § ."7
The Senate Report accompanying the bill emphasized that the purpose was to
refocus and insure that the basis for decision-making concerning the National
Park System continues to be the criteria provided by 16 U.S.C. § 1 because
the committee had been concerned that litigation with regard to Redwood
National Park and other areas of the system may have blurred the responsibil-
ities articulated by the 1916 Act creating the National Park Service.
Accordingly ... The Secretary is to afford the highest standard of
protection and care to the natural resources within Redwood National
Park and the National Park System. No decision shall compromise
these resource values except as Congress may have specifically pro-
vided."
In 1980 the U.S. district court in the District of Columbia relied on this
language to reject the notion of a separate public trust outside the statutory
duties imposed on the NPS.' On the other hand, the court found that the
NPS had very broad discretionary power from several sources.
112. 16 U.S.C. §§ 79c(a), (e) (1994).
113. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974); Sierra Club v. Dep't
of Interior, 398 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
114. Sierra Club, 376 F. Supp. at 95-96.
115. Sierra Club, 398 F. Supp. at 293.
116. Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
117. See 16 U.S.C. § la-l.
118. S. REP. No. 528, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1977); see also H.R. REP. No. 581, 95th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1977).
119. Sierra Club v. Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), affd sub nom. Sierra Club v.
Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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In Andrus, the Sierra Club sued to force the Interior Department to assert
federal water rights in water courses affecting the Grand Canyon and Glen
Canyon, both within units of the National Park System.2 The court agreed
that in the event of a real threat to the water supply for scenic, biotic or natu-
ral purposes in those areas, the Secretary would be required to take action. 2'
The Court noted that the statutes do not provide a mechanism for how this ac-
tion is to be taken, but found that the Secretary had broad (although not un-
limited) discretion to take action, including but not limited to:
(1) asserting reserved water rights;
(2) acquiring water rights under 16 U.S.C. § 17j-2(g);
(3) denying land exchanges and rights of way; and
(4) bringing trespass or nuisance actions."
The court deferred to the Secretary's discretion and declined to force him
to assert the rights the Sierra Club wanted.
123
The NPS may also have authority under the property clause of the Con-
stitution to control activity outside park boundaries as that activity impinges
upon public property. In Minnesota v. Block,124 the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that Congress could make regulations outside the Boundary
Waters borders because of the property clause. The same court later found that
the NPS also had this power and could regulate delivery of canoes along pub-
lic roads leading into NPS riverways in Missouri, even were the canoe-renting
people never to enter park property."2 Under the property clause, Congress
has power to protect public lands. The Eighth Circuit applied this doctrine to
find that this power extended to regulation on or off public land in order to
protect public land.26
There is thus tentative authority for the NPS to act outside its borders.
Still, as the Andrus court pointed out, it is not entirely clear from NPS statutes
alone how this is to be done. In addition to the methods suggested by the
Andrus court, there are several other possible sources of authority to act, how-
ever.
120. Id. at 445.
121. Id. at 448.
122. Id.
123. d at 452. In Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 842 (D. Colo. 1985), vacated sub nom.
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1990), the district court in Colorado agreed with
the Andrus decision and rejected the notion of a public trust separate from statutory powers. Since
that opinion was vacated for other reasons (see infra note 20), it has no force; however, it illus-
trates a trend in light of the 1978 amendments to reject the idea of public trusteeship while simul-
taneously beefing up the authority imputed to the government by statutes.
124. 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981).
125. Free Enter. Canoe Renters Ass'n v. Watt, 711 F.2d 852 (8th Cir. 1983).
126. Minnesota, 660 F.2d at 1249; accord Free Enter. Canoe, 711 F.2d at 856. It is one thing
to say Congress can do something, and another to say that the NPS can do it absent specific ac-
tion by Congress. Nevertheless, see also Blake Shepard, Note, The Scope of Congress' Constitu-
tional Power Under the Property Clause: Regulating Non-Federal Property to Further the Pur-
poses of National Parks and Wilderness Areas, 11 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479 (1984).
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Conservation and Environmental Statutes
Various environmental statutes may be able to be exploited to help the
NPS protect resources such as water in the parks. Among the statutes to con-
sider are (1) the Clean Water Act, (2) the Endangered Species Act, (3) the
Wilderness Act, and the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act.1
27
Implied Reserved Federal Water Rights
Another potential source of NPS power, depending on the circumstances,
might allow the NPS to assert "implied reserved federal water rights" in land
outside the park. This doctrine, developed in the courts, provides that when the
government withdraws land from the public domain for a federal purpose
(such as a national park or forest) the government impliedly reserves, as
against future users, whatever water rights are needed to effectuate the purpose
for which the land was reserved, but only the amount necessary to accomplish
those purposes. The key is the intent of Congress for the use of the land at the
time it was withdrawn from the public domain for a use such as a park or for-
est.U This intent is applied vertically, that is, chronologically, and it is this
intent we have sought in the body of this monograph.
The Supreme Court restated this doctrine in a case involving the NPS in
1976: "[W]hen the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public
domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication,
reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accom-
plish the purpose of the reservation.'" This right vests (i.e., you get it) on
the date of the reservation and is superior to future appropriators. In other
words, at the time the government creates a park or a forest, it gets the rights
and no subsequent user can impair them.
Cappaert was a rancher who owned land near Devil's Hole National Mon-
ument (now functionally part of Death Valley National Monument) in Neva-
da.3o President Harry S Truman had reserved the monument in 1952 in part
because of unique fish that lived in a pool in a cavern, and protection of the
pool was specifically mentioned in his proclamation reserving the monu-
ment. '3 The Supreme Court held that the NPS could stop Cappaert from
pumping groundwater on his ranch in amounts that were diminishing the level
127. For a discussion of how some of these statutes might apply, see Mark T. Pifner, Quality
versus Quantity: The Continued Right to Appropriate-Part 11, 15 COLO. LAW. 1204 (1986); see
also John W. Hiscock, Protecting National Park System Buffer Zones: Existing, Proposed, and
Suggested Authority, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 35 (1986). In Sierra Club v. Block, discussed supra
note 16, the Court found that the Wilderness Act created implied federal reserved water rights
(this doctrine is explained below). The opinion attracted some attention from commentators, but as
noted above has since been vacated as not "ripe" for adjudication in the courts.
128. For a discussion of the historical basis of federal reserved water rights, see A. Dan
Tarlock, Protection of Water Flows for National Parks, 22 LAND & WATER L. REv. 29, 38-48
(1987).
129. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976).
130. Id. at 133.
131. Id. at 131-32.
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of the pool and threatening the fish.'
The key issue in Cappaert was whether maintaining the level of the pool
was necessary to the purpose of the reservation of the monument. Moreover,
since the doctrine of implied reservation of water rights reserves only the
amount necessary to accomplish the purpose of the reservation, Cappaert was
allowed to pump some water so long as the level of the pool did not drop to
such a low level that it harmed the fish and other scientifically valuable as-
pects of the pool.133
Compare United States v. New Mexico, 34 where the Supreme Court held
that the United States had not impliedly reserved water rights for aesthetic
wildlife preservation, or recreational purposes when it created the Gila Nation-
al Forest. 35 The Court noted that the purposes for which national forests are
reserved are to protect timber and watershed.'36 The court contrasted the
much broader purposes for which National Parks are reserved, citing the lan-
guage of 16 U.S.C. § . 3
What of National Parks created from National Forest land? The lands of
Rocky Mountain National Park (RMNP) were originally reserved as a national
forest and were only later made a national park, in 1915. As seen in New
Mexico, the purposes, and correspondingly the extent of water rights, are much
narrower for national forests than for parks. Technically, it might be argued
that only national forest rights were reserved at the time of initial reservation
from the public domain. However, this question has been addressed and re-
solved favorably to the NPS by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In United
States v. City of Denver,3 ' the court was asked to determine the extent of
federal reserved water rights in the Colorado, Gunnison, North Platt, White
and Yampa River Basins in Colorado. 3 9 Relying on New Mexico and
Cappaert, the court focused on the precise federal purposes (including the
priority date) for which the lands had been reserved."4
With respect to RMNP, the court held that the priority dates for water
rights related to forest purposes (i.e., protection of watershed and timber) dat-
ed from the creation of the national forest, but that additional, broader rights
consistent with the purposes of a park obtained when the park was created in
1915."" (The court found that the purpose of a national forest was a subset
of the broader purposes of a park, so that simply adding new water rights onto
132. Id. at 147.
133. Id. at 141. Neither Cappaert nor anyone else had any rights to the water before 1952.
The Court thus did not address what happens when the government reserves land and there are
already persons with rights over the appurtenant water. Note also that this case established that the
implied reserved federal rights doctrine applies to ground water as well as surface water. Id. at
144.
134. 438 U.S. 696 (1978)
135. Id. at 711.
136. Id. at 718.
137. Id. at 709.
138. 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982) (en banc).
139. Id. at 4.
140. Id. at 17.
141. Id. at 30.
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existing forest-related rights would not be consistent with the purposes of a
park.) The court thus implied a second reservation from the public domain
when the park was created. 4 The court sent the case back to the water court
to determine the specificity of those rights." 3
Third, the RMNP legislation of 1915 made specific reference to "home-
stead, mineral, right of way" and to "private, municipal, or State ownership";
that is, it made no reference in these contexts to another government agency,
such as the Forest Service, thus implying that upon the designation of the land
as a national park rather than national forest, the Forest Service no longer had
authority within those lands. Much subsequent legislation has made this point
abundantly clear. The act did refer to "rights of way in certain national parks
and the national forests for irrigation and other purposes," but did not ascribe
any authority with respect to those rights of way in national parks to any other
body, and by virtue of specific reference to both national parks and national
forests made it clear that the two were seen as mutually exclusive. The Secre-
tary of the Interior was given the discretion to grant "easemert.z or rights of
way for steam, electric, or similar transportation upon or across the park," but
no reference was made to having discretion to grant such rights of way or
easements for the purposes of irrigation, thus suggesting that the Secretary had
no such discretionary power in this area.
Conclusion
Where water is involved, one may not invariably separate issues of quan-
tity from issues of quality, of course, since a diminution in quality may well
require an increase in quantity to achieve the same purposes, if indeed, one
may in any measure be said to have preserved the natural conditions if there is
a significant change in either quantity or quality. It appears that the federal
reserved water right doctrine would not be applied in a way that would make
142. Id. This approach is similar to that used in the now vacated opinion in Sierra Club v.
Block, discussed supra note 16. The Court ruled that even though the Wilderness Act withdrew
wilderness areas from existing national forests, such areas constituted a "second" withdrawal from
the public domain so that broader water rights relevant to a wilderness as opposed to a forest were
created by the act. Block, 622 F. Supp. at 862. Indeed, the Block Court referred to City of Denver
in its opinion. Id. In vacating the opinion, the 10th Circuit avoided ruling on whether the Wilder-
ness Act implied any new reserved water rights, but referred to them as "alleged" rights. Yeutter,
911 F.2d at 1419. Essentially, the Court vacated the opinion because it thought it was too early to
decide whether any public harm would result from the Forest Service's alleged failure to act, so
that it could not be determined whether the Forest Service was abusing its discretion. Id. at 1414.
143. City of Denver, 656 P.2d at 36. Since passage of the McCarran Act, the United States
may be brought in as a party to a state court water rights adjudication proceeding. Simply stated,
the basic premise of Colorado water rights law is that a person who appropriates water for a bene-
ficial use acquires rights to that water as against future users. For an explanation of how this
works vis-d-vis federal reserved rights, see Navajo Dev. Co. v. Sanderson, 655 P.2d 1374 (Colo.
1982) (en banc). For example, Navajo notes that, if the government wants to acquire water rights
beyond those implied by reservation, it must use state appropriation proceedings or must condemn
the rights. Id. at 1379. Other cases to keep in mind are: Colorado River Water Conservation Dist.
v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976); Yeutter, 911 F.2d at 1419; United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d
631 (Colo. 1986) (en banc); see also Aaron H. Hostyk, Who Controls the Water? The Emerging
Balance Among Federal, State, and Indian Jurisdictional Claims and Its Impact on Energy Devel-
opment in the Upper Colorado and Upper Missouri River Basins, 18 TULSA LJ. 1 (1982).
1997]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
it meaningless-that is, if it is necessary to accomplish the purpose for which
land was reserved to have clean, as well as sufficient, water, then presumably
a right to clean water applies.
If any issue of water quantity (or quality) arises from conflict or interpre-
tation with another federal government agency, the various court decisions that
suggest national parks are to be held to a higher standard of preservation than
lands administered by another agency would seem to apply. In the Committee
Report accompanying the 1916 bill for the NPS, Congress noted that there was
not supposed to be any conflict of jurisdiction among the agencies, but it is
not clear what the Committee meant in practical terms.'" Most of the legis-
lation seems to contemplate that the NPS is to work in cooperation with other
agencies, with no implication of any form of subordination. 45
There is also the simple force of history, public opinion, and common
sense. Whatever may have been read into certain words in 1916, those words
now have relatively agreed upon meanings. The NPS is to "preserve" and
"protect"-that is, make certain through management that a sufficient quantity
of those elements natural to the landscape are retained unto future generations
to carry out the purpose of the establishment of a given park unit; it is to
apply this conservation to the "scenery"-that is, to the aggregate landscape as
broadly perceived to the senses, and most particularly to the eye; it is to apply
it to the "natural" objects-that is, to those individual constituent elements of
the landscape that are "perceptible to one or more of the senses, especially
something that can be seen and felt" (surely a definition applicable to water, to
restrict this commentary to our one sustained example); and it is to apply it to
"historic" objects as well-that is, to individual constituent elements that are
historically part of the landscape to be conserved (and clearly a flow of water,
a pond or lake, that form part of the historic landscape would thus be cov-
ered); as well as to "wild life"-which, were there to be dramatically altered
stream flows, lake levels, or ground water would be seriously affected. Thus,
quite without invoking that most famous portion of the legislation, which
refers to leaving the resources of a park "unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations," one may readily argue that the purposes of a national park
have preeminence over other federal agencies and goals absent specific legisla-
tion to the contrary.
CONCLUSION
Arguably the intent of Congress with respect to any single act cannot be
perfectly devined or proven. The intent of Congress across a number of related
acts, and as adumbrated by other acts that bear upon the related group, may
more nearly be understood. This paper has attempted to judge that intent. It
has argued that the language contained in the preamble to the National Park
144. H.R. REP. No. 700, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1916).
145. See Julie A. Bryan, Comment, The National Park Service Organic Act Prohibits Turning
the Doorstep of Canyonlands National Park into a Nuclear Wasteland, 7 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y
95 (1986). A comment-indeed, any law school journal article at all-does not have the force of
law, of course, though the argument may be found convincing to a court at the appropriate time.
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Service Act of 1916 is not, in fact, contradictory and that Congress did not re-
gard it as contradictory; that to the extent that a contradictory interpretation
can be imputed to the sentence to the preamble quoted in the Introduction to
this paper, that contradiction can be eliminated by reference to the printed
record of Congress at the time, to the private papers of those individuals most
directly responsible for framing the language of the act, and to the prevailing
canons of rhetoric in 1916. Further, it is argued that subsequent legislation,
and numerous interpretations of related legislation by the courts (taking water
as a resource by way of example) sustain the view that there was and is no
inherent contradiction in the preamble to the Act of 1916. The National Park
Service was enjoined by that act, and the mission placed upon the Service was
reinforced by subsequent acts, to conserve the scenic, natural, and historic
resources, and the wild life found in conjunction with those resources, in the
units of the National Park System in such a way as to leave them unimpaired;
this mission had and has precedence over providing means of access, if those
means impair the resources, however much access may add to the enjoyment
of future generations.

